Privacy Protection in Deep Multi-modal Retrieval
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Deep learning techniques have ushered in significant progress in large-scale multi-modal retrieval. Nevertheless, the advanced techniques may be used nefariously to conduct a search that violates the privacy of individuals. In this paper, we propose a novel PrIvacy Protection method (PIP) against malicious multi-modal retrieval models, which proactively transfers original data into adversarial data with quasi-imperceptible perturbations before releasing them. Consequently, unauthorized malicious parties are not able to use deployed deep models to find out desired sensitive information with them. In addition to privacy preserving, PIP synchronously learns an effective multi-modal retrieval model to facilitate authorized uses, endowed with strong resilience to the perturbations. To the best of our knowledge, it is a very first attempt to consider privacy issues in multi-modal retrieval, and encapsulate both privacy protection against unauthorized retrieval and robust multi-modal learning for authorized uses into a unified framework. This work is conducted in the challenging no-box and unsupervised settings, where neither target malicious models nor supervised information is known. The optimization objective of our versatile PIP is achieved through a two-player game between different components with both the intra- and inter-modality graph alignments and the domain distribution alignment considered. Besides, a high-level similarity matrix is developed to obtain reliable guidance for learning. Empirically, we apply the proposed PIP to hashing based multi-modal retrieval scenarios and prove its effectiveness on a range of benchmarks and tasks.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.014 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".