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Preferential trade agreements as insurance

2024· article· en· W3165939751 on OpenAlexaff
Elie Appelbaum, Mark Melatos

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of International Money and Finance · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGlobal trade and economics
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsUncorrelatedEconomicsWelfareRules of originRisk aversion (psychology)International economicsFree tradeExpected utility hypothesisFinancial economicsMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

• Risk averse countries may have an insurance motive for joining a preferential trade agreement. • The desire for insurance by members determines whether a trade agreement forms and its depth. • Differences in member country risk attitudes act as a source of comparative advantage. • Deeper integration allows risk partiality to be exported from less to more risk averse members. • The amount, and correlation, of risk members face influences trade agreement formation and design. We investigate preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation when risk averse countries face demand uncertainty and, hence, have an insurance motive for pursuing trade integration. In this environment, when deciding which type of PTA − if any − they wish to form, countries seek to maximise their net welfare; that is, their expected utility less a risk premium. The desire for insurance influences, not just whether a particular PTA forms, but also the preferred depth of integration. We analyze the insurance implications of free trade agreements (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), and countries choosing to stand alone. We further distinguish between shallow CUs and deep CUs; in the former, members maximise the sum of their individual net welfares, while in the latter they maximise the net value of the sum of their individual expected welfares. We show that differences in country risk attitudes and the levels of risk they face, as well as the degree to which these risks are correlated with each other, each, and together, influence the formation and design of TAs. When countries’ demands are uncorrelated, they form a deep CU if their levels of risk aversion are sufficiently different. If, however, their risk attitudes are similar, countries opt for shallower trade integration − either a shallow CU or a FTA − if they face low levels of uncertainty, and choose to stand alone if one country faces a sufficiently high level of uncertainty. When countries’ demands are correlated, they tend to form a deep CU if their demands are strongly negatively correlated, a FTA if their demands are strongly positively correlated and a shallow CU when their demands are weakly correlated. Intuitively, differences in country risk attitudes (i.e., their degree of risk aversion) act as an additional source of comparative advantage. Deeper integration − particularly via a CU − permits less risk averse members to essentially export their relative partiality for risk to more risk averse partners, thereby effectively providing the latter with insurance.

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How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.808
Threshold uncertainty score0.391

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.037
GPT teacher head0.230
Teacher spread0.193 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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