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Record W3167757819 · doi:10.1145/3433210.3453103

Low-Cost Hiding of the Query Pattern

2021· article· en· W3167757819 on OpenAlexaff
Maryam Sepehri, Florian Kerschbaum

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCryptography and Data Security
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceQuery optimizationRange query (database)EncryptionPaddingSargableWeb search queryQuery expansionPlaintextSpatial queryOnline aggregationSmoothingWeb query classificationOverhead (engineering)Data miningTheoretical computer scienceDatabaseInformation retrievalComputer securitySearch engine

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Several attacks have shown that the leakage from the access pattern in searchable encryption is dangerous. Attacks exploiting leakage from the query pattern are as dangerous, but less explored. While there are known, lightweight countermeasures to hide information in the access pattern by padding the ciphertexts, the same is not true for the query pattern. Oblivious RAM hides the query patterns, but requires a logarithmic overhead in the size of the database and hence will become even slower as data grows. In this paper we present a query smoothing algorithm to hide the frequency information in the query pattern of searchable encryption schemes by introducing fake queries. Our method only introduces a constant overhead of 7 to 13 fake queries per real query in our experiments. Furthermore, we show that our query smoothing algorithm can also be applied to range-searchable encryption schemes and then prevents all recent plaintext recovery attacks.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.894
Threshold uncertainty score0.109

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.223
Teacher spread0.210 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designBench or experimental
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2021
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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