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Record W3172480584

Tight bounds on the relative performances of pricing mechanisms in storable good markets

2018· article· en· W3172480584 on OpenAlexaff
Gerardo Berbeglia, Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta

Bibliographic record

VenueLecture notes in computer science · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMonopolyEconomicsMicroeconomicsProfitability indexProfit (economics)Valuation (finance)Finance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In the storable good monopoly problem, a monopolist sells a storable good by announcing a price in each time period. Each consumer has a unitary demand per time period with an arbitrary valuation. In each period, consumers may buy none, one, or more than one good (in which case the extra goods are stored for future consumption incurring a linear storage cost). We compare the performance of two important pricing mechanisms on the profitability of the monopolist: pre-announced pricing mechanisms and price contingent mechanisms. In pre-announced pricing the prices in each time period are stated in advance; in a price contingent mechanism each price is stated at the start of the time period, and these prices are dependent upon past purchases. We prove that the monopolist can earn at most O(log T + log N) times more profit by using a pre-announced pricing mechanism rather than a price contingent mechanism. Here T denotes the number of time periods and N denotes the number of consumers. This bound is tight; examples exist where the monopolist would earn a factor Ω (log T + log N) more by using a pre-announced pricing mechanism.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.686
Threshold uncertainty score0.327

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.003
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.325
Teacher spread0.287 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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