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Record W3176733198 · doi:10.1109/tac.2022.3206253

Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games With Impulse Control

2022· preprint· en· W3176733198 on OpenAlexafffund
Utsav Sadana, Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Georges Zaccour

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · 2022
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicOptimization and Variational Analysis
Canadian institutionsHEC MontréalMcGill UniversityGroup for Research in Decision Analysis
FundersFonds de recherche du Québec – Nature et technologiesScience and Engineering Research Board
KeywordsNash equilibriumDifferential gameMathematicsEpsilon-equilibriumBest responseMathematical economicsCorrelated equilibriumHamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equationExample of a game without a valueSequential gameMathematical optimizationApplied mathematicsComputer scienceRepeated gameBellman equationEquilibrium selectionNormal-form gameGame theory

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this article, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, whereas Player 2 uses impulse controls. For this class of games, we seek to derive conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. More specifically, we provide a verification theorem for identifying such equilibrium strategies, using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for Player 1 and the quasi-variational inequalities for Player 2. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium number of interventions by Player 2 is upper bounded. Furthermore, we specialize the obtained results in a scalar two-player linear–quadratic differential game. In this game, Player 1’s objective is to drive the state variable toward a specific target value, and Player 2 has a similar objective with a different target value. We provide, for the first time, an analytical characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium in a linear–quadratic differential game with impulse control. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.014

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.009
GPT teacher head0.231
Teacher spread0.223 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2022
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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