Security Audit of Docker Container Images in Cloud Architecture
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Containers technology radically changed the ways for packaging applications and deploying them as services in cloud environments. According to the recent report on security predictions of 2020 by Trend Micro, the vulnerabilities in container components deployed with cloud architecture have been one of the top security concerns for development and operations teams in enterprises. Docker is one of the leading container technologies that automate the deployment of applications into containers. Docker Hub is a public repository by Docker for storing and sharing the Docker images. These Docker images are pulled from the Docker Hub repository and the security of images being used from the repositories in any cloud environment could be at risk. Vulnerabilities in Docker images could have a detrimental effect on enterprise applications. In this paper, the focus is on securing the Docker images using vulnerability centric approach (VCA) to detect the vulnerabilities. A set of use cases compliant with the NIST SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide is developed for audit compliance of Docker container images with the OWASP Container Security Verification Standards (CSVS). In this paper, firs vulnerabilities of Docker container images are identified and assessed using the VCA. Then, a set of use cases to identify presence of the vulnerabilities is developed to facilitate the security audit of the container images. Finally, it is illustrated how the proposed use cases can be mapped with the requirements of the OWASP Container Security Verification Standards. The use cases can serve as a security auditing tool during the development, deployment, and maintenance of cloud microservices applications.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.021 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".