Comparatively Analyzing the Impact of Government Subsidy and Carbon Tax Policy on Authorized Remanufacturing
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Authorized remanufacturing is an important means to achieve green manufacturing and carbon neutrality. In this study, a game theory model between a manufacturer and a remanufacturer was constructed to analyze the impact of government subsidies and carbon tax policies on authorized remanufacturing. Based on the game theory model, the effects of two government policies on the optimal solution, namely, the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the waste product recovery rate, were compared and analyzed. This analysis could provide a reference for the government to improve and formulate relevant remanufacturing policies. The main results are as follows: government subsidy policies may increase the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the rates of waste product recovery; government carbon tax policies may not affect the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization, and increase the rates of waste product recovery; the government subsidy policy may not affect the unit retail price of new products, and reduces the unit retail price of remanufactured products; the government subsidy and carbon tax policies may reduce sales of new products and increase sales of remanufactured products; the government subsidies may increase the revenue of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the remanufacturer; and the government carbon tax policies may increase the revenue of the remanufacturer. However, government carbon tax policies increase the revenue of the OEM only when the new product carbon tax amount is higher than a certain threshold. The impact of the two policies on the environment is related to the ratio of the two products' impact on the environment, i.e., the quota ratio between the unit government carbon tax of the new product and the unit government subsidy of the remanufactured product. Finally, the consumer surplus is maximized when the government adopts the subsidy policy and lowest when the government adopts the carbon tax policy.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".