Arbitration, the World Trade Organization, and the Creation of a Multilateral Investment Court
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract The proliferation of international tribunals has reached the investment sphere. The European Union and its treaty partners have included an investment court system in the four individual investment agreements they have negotiated since the European Union took competence over foreign direct investment with the passage of the Lisbon Treaty. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), with the European Commission’s encouragement, is considering reform of investor-state arbitration with the front runner for reform the establishment of a multilateral investment court. Yet trade and investment law seem to be an oddly inverse relationship when it comes to preferred modes of dispute settlement. In the trade law realm, the survival of the ‘crown jewel’ of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)—its Dispute Settlement Body is uncertain. The appellate body has recently come in for special opprobrium. Arbitration is one of the suggested alternatives should existing dispute settlement procedures cease to function. Thus, in the investment law sphere, arbitration is apparently more and more disfavoured, and the preferred alternative is some kind of standing body with the pièce de résistance—an appellate body—at its apex. Why are these two regimes asynchronous? I hypothesize that states favour judicialization of disputes in the abstract but have reservations once judicialization becomes more concrete. Judicial or quasi-judicial decisions are hard for individual states to ignore or discredit, yet states have difficulty organizing multilateral responses to decisions they dislike.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.020 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.014 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".