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Record W319779635

Fueling the Future: The Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas

2002· article· en· W319779635 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Fiona Hill, Florence Fee

Bibliographic record

VenueDemokratizatsiya The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization · 2002
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEnergy
TopicGlobal Energy Security and Policy
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsOffensiveMiddle EastPetroleum industryTerrorismDownstream (manufacturing)PetroleumEconomyInternational tradePolitical scienceEconomicsLawEngineering
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, growing tensions in American relations with Middle East states coincided with the efforts of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) to impose production cuts to shore up petroleum prices. U.S. plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the worsening crisis in Israel and Palestine, a backlash in Saudi Arabia against long-term U.S. military presence, and the possibility that it would become the staging ground for an attack on Iraq all led to questions in Washington, D.C., about the wisdom of continuing to rely on Middle East oil. Discussions of possible alternatives threw the spotlight on Russia, along with other oil-producing areas in the Caspian Basin and West Africa. Since 1998, Russia's oil industry has experienced a significant revival after a cataclysmic collapse in output in the 1990s. Some of its oil companies have achieved significant production increases, produced ambitious plans to break into new energy markets, expanded into international upstream and downstream operations, and launched a public relations offensive to present themselves as players in the global economy. (1) Against this backdrop, Russia, which is not a member of OPEC, mounted a fierce public resistance to the organization's demands that it cut its production and exports. Ultimately, in December 2001, agreed to a token export reduction of 150,000 barrels per day for the winter quarter. That reflected normal seasonal cuts implemented by Russian oil companies operating in the extreme cold of Siberia and bottled in by winter port restrictions. Moscow's snub to OPEC was obvious. Russia suddenly became one of the new great hopes of Western efforts to diversify U.S. and world oil supplies beyond the Middle East and Persian Gulf. As American energy secretary Spencer Abraham noted during a November 2001 visit to Moscow, Russia seemed to be emerging as a separate nucleus of the energy equation. (2) In the Washington Post in December 2001, David Ignatius asserted that Moscow is on its way to becoming the next Houston--the global capital of energy. (3) By January 2002, Russia's President Putin had been hailed by a Canadian newspaper as the world's new oil Czar, (4) and the Russian media was replete with commentary on Russia's role as the new power broker in international energy markets. In an extended article in the March/April 2002 issue of the preeminent American journal Foreign Affairs, two energy analysts went so far as to suggest that Russia--together with the energy-rich states of the former Soviet Union clustered around the Caspian Basin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)--was poised to challenge Saudi Arabia for global energy dominance. Russia, they argued, could soon displace Saudi Arabia and OPEC in oil markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia. (5) The authors, along with media commentators, saw increases in Russian oil production and new reserve finds in the Caspian Basin as evidence of substantial future export capacity. In addition, they depicted the Russian energy industry as an independent actor, emancipated from state control (unlike the state-held oil companies of OPEC members), which was eager to help the United States and the West break free from OPEC dependency by becoming a reliable, long-term energy partner. Certainly, the Soviet Union was a major international energy player in the 1980s, and Russia has assumed much of that mantle since its dissolution, but in 2002 Russia's grip on the attention of the media and international energy analysts is due more to a confluence of events and circumstance than a serious assessment of the country's energy capabilities. In most discussions of Russian energy, the extent of Russian oil production capacity is not questioned. Differences between Russian gas and oil assets are not distinguished. Little distinction is made between Russian energy and that of other Caspian Basin states, and the relationship between the Russian energy industry and the state is not questioned. …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.008
Threshold uncertainty score0.026

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0030.002
Scholarly communication0.0040.005
Open science0.0000.002
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.010
GPT teacher head0.222
Teacher spread0.212 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations20
Published2002
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueDemokratizatsiya The Journal of Post-Soviet DemocratizationSame topicGlobal Energy Security and PolicyFrench-language works237,207