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Record W3210896474 · doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3122115

Differential Game Approach for Attack-Defense Strategy Analysis in Internet of Things Networks

2021· article· en· W3210896474 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Internet of Things Journal · 2021
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Windsor
FundersBeijing Municipal Natural Science FoundationToyota Motor CorporationNational Natural Science Foundation of ChinaAmazon CatalystNational Science Foundation
KeywordsComputer scienceDifferential gameGame theoryComputer securityStackelberg competitionSaddle pointCompetition (biology)Nash equilibriumResource (disambiguation)Mathematical optimizationComputer networkMathematical economicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Internet of Things (IoT) is vulnerable to various cyber attacks due to the massive deployment of IoT devices and the openness of wireless environments. In this article, taking IoT devices as the network resources competed between an attacker and a defender, we study the modeling and analysis of network resource competition in an attack-defense game. The attacker and defender inject different competition strength in each IoT device as their strategies. As a result, the security state of each IoT device will change, which is captured by differential equations. To study the interaction between the attacker and defender and the evolution of the system security states, a zero-sum differential game is formulated by modeling the competition of IoT devices. To achieve the equilibrium of the formulated differential game, optimal control theory is employed to solve the optimization problems of players. Further, a Gauss–Seidel-like implicit finite-difference method is utilized to obtain the saddle point strategy. Finally, numerical results are provided to demonstrate the evolution of network resource competition between the attacker and defender. The results show that our formulated model can effectively and accurately characterize the evolution of the system security states with strategic interactions between the attacker and defender.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.676
Threshold uncertainty score0.863

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.024
GPT teacher head0.261
Teacher spread0.237 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it