The Importance of Social Mechanisms in the Commission of or Resistance to Group Fraud: A Field Study
Bibliographic record
Abstract
We analyze 19 stories from individuals who committed group fraud and 19 from those who resisted pressure to commit group fraud. Our goal is to better understand the control mechanisms that helped push people toward or against group fraud. Our theoretical lens highlights the implications of the social nature of “group” fraud and classifies the mechanisms we examine into social and administrative mechanisms. Social mechanisms are based on the influence of others (e.g., culture, mentorship) while administrative mechanisms are based on rules and policies (e.g., reward systems). We find that social mechanisms are significantly more influential than administrative mechanisms in pushing individuals toward the commission of and resistance to group fraud. Leveraging Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we also identify combinations of control mechanisms that commonly lead to the commission of and resistance to group fraud. Our field study enriches group fraud literature and identifies control mechanisms in which practitioners should invest.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.020 | 0.062 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.015 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".