Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
IN APRIL 2002, delegates from 66 nations and dozens of nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) gathered at United Nations headquarters in New York to celebrate the ratification of the treaty creating the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the back of the room, the chair reserved for the delegate from the United States stood empty, and in a subsequent letter the Bush administration confirmed that the U.S. would not participate in or be bound by the court in any way. The treaty establishing the court entered into force on July 1, 2002, thereby creating what many describe as the most important international institution since the United Nations over the opposition of the most powerful nation in the world. The celebratory spirit in New York was nothing compared to the delegates' reaction in Rome in the summer of 1998. After five weeks of negotiation over the ICC treaty, the United States was clearly frustrated with the politics and maneuvering of a group that called itself like-minded states and their collaborators, the NGOS. On the final day, the U.S. called for a vote and found itself on the losing side by a stunning 129-7. Normally reserved diplomats broke out in cheers and chants, accompanied by rhythmic stomping and applause. Yes, the treaty creating an International Criminal Court had been approved, but more than that, the had won a major victory over the United States. Debuting as the in 1996, the new diplomacy successfully led a fast track campaign of NGOS and small and medium sized nations to a treaty banning anti-personnel land mines. The bold break from traditional processes, the innovative methodology, and the amazing speed of these efforts won widespread attention, as well as a share of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for the NGO leader, American Jody Williams. Still, there were unique features to developing the land mine treaty that did not seem easily replicable, and few could foresee that the Ottawa Process might be the first act of a major new diplomatic drama. With Act Two, the establishment of an International Criminal Court, under its belt, the new diplomacy has now moved from its Ottawa debut to the center stage of the diplomatic world in Rome and New York. It is time for a critical review of its performance, including an understanding of its actors and methods, how others including the United States might interact with it, and what the future for the new diplomacy may hold. The end of Cold War diplomacy THE END OF THE Cold War and its predictable structure of international relations set the stage for new forms of diplomacy. From the close of World War 11 to the fall of the Berlin wall, the great powers that opposed Hitler dominated the diplomatic stage. In a bipolar world based on ideology, the opposing forces lined up in conventional ways, with both military and diplomatic battles fought between states. Even the structure of international organizations such as the United Nations bore the stamp of the great powers, with the five permanent members of the Security Council able to veto proposals not consonant with their national interest. The Cold War drama generally pitted the U.S. versus the Soviet Union, often involving surrogate states. In his 1992. state of the union address, President George H.W Bush took note of the changing global scene, boasting that the United States was now the world's sole and preeminent power and the undisputed leader of the age.' Familiar, perhaps even comfortable, with a bipolar world, experts began the search for the next American rival. Much attention focused on China, though it seemed to be some distance away from superpower status. Others wondered whether Europe, beginning to band together for trade and monetary policy, might form an influential bloc. Most assumed that the U.S. alone would dominate the post-Cold War world or that, ultimately, alliances or other countries would rise to challenge its leadership. …
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it