OVER THE RIVER AND (AROUND) THE WOODS TO GRANDMA'S HOUSE WE GO: LONG-TERM FIRM TRANSMISSION RIGHTS, TRANSMISSION MARKET POWER & GAMING STRATEGIES IN A DEREGULATED ENERGY MARKET-AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Bibliographic record
Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION REGULATION A. The Infancy of Electricity Deregulation B. The Deregulatory Era: 2000 to Present III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES A. The New, Semi-Independent Status of the Power Grid Destabilizes Coordination Between Interconnections B. Underinvestment in the Infrastructure Exacerbates the Problems Associated With the Power Grid C. Poor Separation Between Generation and Transmission Facilities Undermines the Goal of Competition in Wholesale Electricity Markets IV. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM FIRM TRANSMISSION RIGHTS AND OTHER HEDGING STRATEGIES A. The Essential Facilities Doctrine B. First Generation Antitrust Cases C. Second Generation Cases D. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines & The Inability of Antitrust Law to Remedy Transmission Market Power E. Transmission Market Power 1. The Process of Transmitting Electricity 2. Gaming Behaviors that Undermine Competition V. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DEREGULATION EFFORTS AND NEW MARKET STRUCTURES A. Deregulation of Electricity in the European Union (Community) 1. The Scandinavian Countries (Nord Pool) 2. England B. Transmission Market Power in the European Union C. Argentina Market Structure and Gaming Behaviors VI. REMEDIES MITIGATING THE ACCUMULATION AND EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER IN TRANSMISSION MARKETS A. Nationalization of the Transmission Grid Under the Supervision of a Monopoly Transmission Company B. Functional Separation of Generation and Transmission VII. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION At 4:10 p.m., on August 14, 2003, dozens of patrons at the Cedar Point Amusement Park in Sandusky, Ohio sat suspended in the air within the confined spaces of the Magnum XL200 roller coaster, which had come to a sudden halt three-quarters of the way up the steepest drop. (1) At this time, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; and Toronto and Ottawa, Canada; endured a complete electrical blackout that lasted until 1 a.m. the following day for many customers. (2) Authorities attributed the blackout to multiple failures in the electricity grid. (3) In the last forty years, various portions of the United States endured a complete, albeit temporary, loss of electricity due to grid failure. (4) These instances highlight the need for a more secure, reliable, and competitive transmission grid. Recently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) promulgated Order No. 681, which extended the duration of long-term firm electrical transmission rights for current holders of such rights to ensure reliable electrical flows without harming competition. (5) Previously, FERC failed to delineate clearly any specifications as to the duration of long-term firm transmission rights, but FERC had a marked preference for longer terms of transmission service. (6) For example, FERC has, on occasion, allowed terms of transmission service up to twenty years in duration. (7) Order No. 681, however, will further exacerbate many of the market power issues experienced in U.S. electricity markets. (8) Because electrical transmission capacity should be an essential facility within the context of antitrust enforcement, FERC's decision to extend the duration of long-term firm transmission rights will serve to limit competition as holders of long-term firm transmission have incentives to congest transmission lines and engage in other gaming behaviors to prevent entry into deregulated electricity markets. (9) This Article will provide: (1) a brief history of electricity deregulation and the current structure of the transmission grid; (2) a discussion of the antitrust implications of firm transmission rights and gaming behaviors; (3) examples of how the international community addresses the noncompetitive aspects of transmission capacity; and (4) a cost/benefit analysis of possible remedies, including a complete separation of generation from transmission facilities and a complete nationalization of the transmission market. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".