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Record W380080350 · doi:10.32219/isms.69.3_387

TALMUDIC BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM : SPECIAL AND GENERAL SOLUTIONS

2009· article· en· W380080350 on OpenAlexaff
Isaac Elishakoff, André Bégin‐Drolet

Bibliographic record

VenueScientiae mathematicae Japonicae · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversité Laval
Fundersnot available
KeywordsTalmudBankruptcyProportionality (law)LawMathematicsMathematical economicsEgalitarianismEconomic JusticeJudaismPolitical sciencePhilosophyTheology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

An elementary solution is presented to the special bankruptcy problem described in the Babylonian Talmud. The presented solution pertains to the numerical data presented in the Tractate of Kethuboth 93a. General solution for any combination of data is also given. Solution of the special case appears to be suitable for inclusion in courses on economy, as well as in group study environments. 1 Introduction Modern solutions of division problems are based, primarily on the idea of proportionality, advocated by Aristotle: just act necessarily involves at least four terms: two persons for whom it is in fact just, and two shares in which its justice is exhibited. And there will be the same equality between the shares as between the persons, because the shares will be in the same ratio to one another as the persons what is just in this sense, then, is what is proportional, and what is unjust is what violates the proportion. Oppenheim (17) interprets the Aristotelian approach as follows: Aristotle himself enlarged the criterion of egalitarianism to include rules which allot shares to equals; i.e. equal shares of some specified kind to all who are equal with respect to some specified characteristic. Conversely, a rule is inegalitarian when either equals are awarded unequal shares or unequals equal shares. However, is not necessarily synonymous with justice. Impressive examples of fair division which do not use proportionality in the usual setting are given in the Mishna (24, 25), a 1800-year old document that forms the basis for Jewish civil, criminal, and religious law. This paper deals with a division problem discussed in the Mishna, tractate Kethuboth (28). The particular allocations mentioned there, in the terminology of Aumann and Maschler (2) look mysterious; but whatever they may mean, they do not fit any obvious extension of either equal or proportional division. Over two millennia, this Mishna has spawned a large literature. Many authorities disagree with it outright. Others attribute the figures to special circumstances not made explicit in the A few have attempted direct rationalization of the figures as such, mostly with little success. One modern scholar, exasperated by his inability to make sense of the text, suggested errors in transcription. In brief, the passage is notoriously difficult. For this problem, which we have not yet introduced, Aumann and Maschler (2) provided an algorithm for solution in their breakthrough paper via the game-theoretic approach, utilizing the nucleolus concept. They presented, in their own words, three different justifications of the solution to the bankruptsy problem that the nucleolus prescribes in terms that are independent of each other and of game theory, and that were well within the reach of the sages of the Mishna. A remarkable fact is that the non-game-theoretic approaches were identified by Aumann and Maschler (2) after they had found the solution via game-theoretic analysis; again in their own words, only after realizing that the numbers in the Mishna correspond to the nucleolus did we find independent rationales. Without the 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. 01A07 ethnomathematics, 91B mathematical economics, 97D education and instruction in mathematics.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.390
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.226
Teacher spread0.193 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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