Essais sur les logiciels libres : licences doubles, effets de réseau, et concurrence
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be modified or duplicated by anyone. The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source firm's investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the market reduces the firm's investment in quality and increases the price of its software. Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm's incentive to invest in quality. The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling supporting product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the provision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist. Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from developers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product. This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source. The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm's lower price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.006 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it