Vehicle Routing with Stochastic Supply of Crowd Vehicles and Time Windows
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
The growth of e-commerce has increased demand for last-mile deliveries, increasing the level of congestion in the existing transportation infrastructure in urban areas. Crowdsourcing deliveries can provide the additional capacity needed to meet the growing demand in a cost-effective way. We introduce a setting where a crowd-shipping platform sells heterogeneous products of different sizes from a central depot. Items sold vary from groceries to electronics. Some items must be delivered within a time window, whereas others need a customer signature. Furthermore, customer presence is not guaranteed, and some deliveries may need to be returned to the depot. Delivery requests are fulfilled by a fleet of professional drivers and a pool of crowd drivers. We present a crowd-shipping platform that standardizes crowd drivers’ capacities and compensates them to return undelivered packages back to the depot. We formulate a two-stage stochastic model, and we propose a branch and price algorithm to solve the problem exactly and a column generation heuristic to solve larger problems quickly. We further develop an analytical method to calculate upper bounds on the supply of vehicles and an innovative cohesive pricing problem to generate columns for the pool of crowd drivers. Computational experiments are carried out on modified Solomon instances with a pool of 100 crowd vehicles. The branch and price algorithm is able to solve instances of up to 100 customers. We show that the value of the stochastic solution can be as high as 18% when compared with the solution obtained from a deterministic simplification of the model. Significant cost reductions of up to 28% are achieved by implementing crowd drivers with low compensations or higher capacities. Finally, we evaluate what happens when crowd drivers are given the autonomy to select routes based on rational and irrational behavior. There is no cost increase when crowd drivers are rational and select routes that have a higher compensation first. However, when crowd drivers are irrational and select routes randomly, the cost can increase up to 4.2% for some instances.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it