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Record W4210359252 · doi:10.1257/mic.20190203

Learning in Relational Contracts

2022· article· en· W4210359252 on OpenAlexaff
Rumen Kostadinov, Aditya Kuvalekar

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcMaster University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInefficiencyRelational contractQuality (philosophy)Action (physics)MicroeconomicsYield (engineering)Stochastic gameLimit (mathematics)EconomicsEconometricsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker’s actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatience vanishes. We characterize optimal relational contracts and show that they involve actions that yield both a lower payoff and less information than another action. (JEL D83, D86, J22, J31, J41, J63)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.044
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.045

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.044
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0020.004
Scholarly communication0.0040.008
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0040.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.327
Teacher spread0.288 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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