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Record W4213088823 · doi:10.1145/3410048.3410108

Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms

2020· article· en· W4213088823 on OpenAlexafffund
Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman, Juba Ziani

Bibliographic record

VenueACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review · 2020
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaDefense Advanced Research Projects AgencyIsrael National Cyber DirectorateHebrew University of JerusalemCalifornia Institute of TechnologyIsrael Science FoundationFonds de recherche du Québec – Nature et technologiesAlfred P. Sloan FoundationNational Science Foundation
KeywordsRevenueCommon value auctionLogarithmFraction (chemistry)MicroeconomicsComputer scienceConstant (computer programming)Disjoint setsOrder (exchange)EconometricsBusinessEconomicsMathematicsFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data providers on mechanism design. When no data provider is present, it has been shown that simple mechanisms are "good enough" -they can achieve a constant fraction of the revenue of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper demonstrate that this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data provider who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with the item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder, and a single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing each item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multiitem auctions) and bundling all item-types under a single price (the analog of grand bundling) can both simultaneously be a logarithmic factor worse than the optimal revenue. Further, in the presence of a data provider, item-type partitioning mechanisms-a more general class of mechanisms which divide item-types into disjoint groups and offer prices for each group-still cannot achieve within a log log factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated mechanisms in order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.048
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.086
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.048
Threshold uncertainty score0.253

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0480.086
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.002
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.003
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0020.007
Scholarly communication0.0080.024
Open science0.0050.006
Research integrity0.0050.007
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.503
GPT teacher head0.483
Teacher spread0.020 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2020
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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Same venueACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation ReviewSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207