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Record W4213114778 · doi:10.1108/ijmf-10-2021-0511

Executive compensation linked to corporate social responsibility and firm risk

2022· article· en· W4213114778 on OpenAlexaff
Lucia Silva Gao, Shahbaz Sheikh, Hong Zhou

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Managerial Finance · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsWestern University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsExecutive compensationCorporate social responsibilityEndogeneityBusinessIncentiveEnterprise valueCompensation (psychology)AccountingActuarial scienceSystematic riskEconometricsMicroeconomicsEconomicsFinancePsychologyPublic relationsSocial psychology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Purpose The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between executive compensation linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm risk. It also explores the moderating role of CSR-linked compensation on the relationship between risk-taking incentives provided in executive compensation and firm risk. Design/methodology/approach This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and firm-fixed effects regressions to estimate the association between CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. Furthermore, it employs instrumental variable, propensity score matching and first-order difference approaches to address concerns about endogeneity and sample selection. Findings Benchmark results show that CSR-linked compensation reduces both total and idiosyncratic measures of risk. Further results indicate that CSR-linked compensation reduces firm risk only when risk is above the optimal level and has no significant effect when risk is below the optimal level. Additionally, tests show that CSR-linked compensation also mitigates the positive effect of Vega of executive compensation on risk and this mitigation effect is significant only when risk is above the optimal level. Practical implications The empirical results of this study show that boards can use CSR-linked compensation not only to induce higher social performance but also as a risk management tool to manage risk, especially when risk is above value increasing optimal levels. Furthermore, boards can use CSR-linked compensation to mitigate excessive risk-taking induced by option compensation. Originality/value This study contributes to the emerging literature on CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. To our knowledge, this is the first study that documents the direct risk-reducing effect of CSR-linked compensation and its mitigating effect on the relation between Vega of executive compensation and firm risk.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.399
Threshold uncertainty score0.540

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.025
GPT teacher head0.245
Teacher spread0.220 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations20
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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