Beyond lobbying: the political determinants of adopting corporate social responsibility frameworks in the European Union and the USA
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper explores the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an element in a corporation’s political action repertoire. Previous research has studied lobbying and CSR as a distinct means by which corporations seek to manage their non-market environment. Analyzing CSR as a political activity, we argue that corporations engage in CSR for the same reasons that prompt them to engage in lobbying. More specifically, we expect corporations to adopt CSR frameworks that are suitable to enhance their reputation in a given political arena. To evaluate this argument, we analyze the lobbying and CSR behavior in the EU and USA of over 2000 corporations from around the world. Our results show that lobbying and adopting CSR frameworks can be predicted by similar empirical models. Moreover, controlling for common predictors and endogeneity, lobbying in the EU is associated with an increased likelihood of a corporation adopting an appropriate CSR framework. However, corporations that lobby in Washington DC become less likely to engage in CSR the more they spend on lobbying. These findings shed new light on the relationship between lobbying and CSR while highlighting important differences in corporate non-market behavior across political arenas.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.016 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".