Pricing Decision for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Technology Licensing under Collection and Remanufacturing Cost Disruptions
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management faces collection and remanufacturing cost disruption challenges. This study explores a CLSC system wherein original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) license the third-party remanufacturer (TPR) to bear the remanufacturing activities and investigate pricing decisions in the CLSC, while considering collection and remanufacturing cost disruptions. To obtain the optimal pricing strategy, we develop game theory models under the disruptions of both centralized and decentralized CLSCs. Based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we obtain the following results: (1) Whether or not disruption events occur, the centralized supply chain can better encourage consumers to participate in the collection of used products than a decentralized supply chain; (2) when collection disruption in a large positive region or the remanufacturing cost disruption in a large negative region occurs, OEM and TPR profits will greatly increase, and the OEM will raise the licensing fee to extract more profit from the remanufacturing activity; (3) a certain robust region exists for the retail price and wholesale price when the supply chain faces disruption increase; (4) when the supply chain faces the disruptions, it has great influence on the OEM’s licensing fee but little on the TPR’s acquisition price. The main contributions of the study include: (1) We considered the impacts of both technology licensing and collection and remanufacturing cost disruption; (2) we developed game theory models to determine the optimal manufacturing and remanufacturing quantities, and pricing strategy under the disruptions; (3) based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we presented some interesting and important insights. The results of this paper could provide useful guidelines for supply chain members on how to effectively control costs to obtain more profit by adjusting prices and selecting a better operation mode for the closed-loop supply chain.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".