Generative Adversarial Network-Driven Detection of Adversarial Tasks in Mobile Crowdsensing
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Mobile Crowdsensing systems are vulnerable to various attacks as they build on non-dedicated and ubiquitous properties. Machine learning (ML)-based approaches are widely investigated to build attack detection systems and ensure MCS systems security. However, adversaries that aim to clog the sensing front-end and MCS back-end leverage intelligent techniques, which are challenging for MCS platform and service providers to develop appropriate detection frameworks against these attacks. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been applied to generate synthetic samples, that are extremely similar to the real ones, deceiving classifiers such that the synthetic samples are indistinguishable from the originals. Previous works suggest that GAN-based attacks exhibit more crucial devastation than empirically designed attack samples, and result in low detection rate at the MCS platform. With this in mind, this paper aims to detect intelligently designed illegitimate sensing service requests by integrating a GAN-based model. To this end, we propose a two-level cascading classifier that combines the GAN discriminator with a binary classifier to prevent adversarial fake tasks. Through simulations, we compare our results to a single-level binary classifier, and the numeric results show that proposed approach raises Adversarial Attack Detection Rate (AADR), from 0% to 97.5% by KNN/NB, from 45.9% to 100% by Decision Tree. Meanwhile, with two-levels classifiers, Original Attack Detection Rate (OADR) improves for the three binary classifiers, with comparison, such as NB from 26.1% to 61.5%.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".