Incentive Mechanisms for Smart Grid: State of the Art, Challenges, Open Issues, Future Directions
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Smart grids (SG) are electricity grids that communicate with each other, provide reliable information, and enable administrators to operate energy supplies across the country, ensuring optimized reliability and efficiency. The smart grid contains sensors that measure and transmit data to adjust the flow of electricity automatically based on supply/demand, and thus, responding to problems becomes quicker and easier. This also plays a crucial role in controlling carbon emissions, by avoiding energy losses during peak load hours and ensuring optimal energy management. The scope of big data analytics in smart grids is huge, as they collect information from raw data and derive intelligent information from the same. However, these benefits of the smart grid are dependent on the active and voluntary participation of the consumers in real-time. Consumers need to be motivated and conscious to avail themselves of the achievable benefits. Incentivizing the appropriate actor is an absolute necessity to encourage prosumers to generate renewable energy sources (RES) and motivate industries to establish plants that support sustainable and green-energy-based processes or products. The current study emphasizes similar aspects and presents a comprehensive survey of the start-of-the-art contributions pertinent to incentive mechanisms in smart grids, which can be used in smart grids to optimize the power distribution during peak times and also reduce carbon emissions. The various technologies, such as game theory, blockchain, and artificial intelligence, used in implementing incentive mechanisms in smart grids are discussed, followed by different incentive projects being implemented across the globe. The lessons learnt, challenges faced in such implementations, and open issues such as data quality, privacy, security, and pricing related to incentive mechanisms in SG are identified to guide the future scope of research in this sector.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it