The Influence of Leadership and Behaviours on Safety Performance
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper describes KCA DEUTAG's innovative approach to applying behavioural safety theory as a practical tool to discover why the Company experiences inconsistent safety performance across its North Sea operations despite the commonality of equipment and procedures. It draws conclusions which result from safety culture surveys, the application of the Step Change, Safety Culture Maturity Model and most recently an analysis by a highly regarded industry expert of the KCA DEUTAG/client interface on several of its' platforms. The paper makes recommendations, which are designed to assist others in the practical application of behavioural safety theory such that consistent improvements in safety performance are achievable.Introduction. KCA DEUTAG is an international land and offshore well engineering contractor employing around 3,500 people worldwide. In the North Sea, where KCA DEUTAG employs some 1,300 offshore workers, activities are solely platform based. The Company provides drill crews and manages drilling operations for Amerada Hess, Apache, BP, Britannia Operator Limited, Canadian Natural Resources, ChevronTexaco, DNO, ExxonMobil, Shell Expro and Total. Although of various ages and states of mechanisation, the main components of the drilling package on each installation are similar. KCA DEUTAG has a well established Health Safety and Environmental Management System, whose policies, standards and processes, many of which are regarded as industry leading by the Health and Safety Executive, are consistent across all of the Company's operations. The Company's recruitment, training and competence processes are also uniform across all of its clients' installations. Employees are transferred between installations through promotion and at times of downmanning.In effect, KCA DEUTAG's North Sea operations are conducted in a similar environment using similar equipment operated by similar people using a standard set of procedures. However, the Company experiences significantly different safety performance on different installations. The variations in safety performance have been within client asset groups as well as across different clients. For example, in 1996, the crews on one client's platforms worked some 830,000 man hours without suffering a Lost Time Incident. In 1997, the same crews on the same clients platforms worked some 930,000 man hours and suffered 11 Lost Time Accidents (as defined by UK RIDDOR regulations which are far more onerous than IADC definitions). KCA DEUTAG crews on certain platforms have performed consistently well whereas crews on other client's platforms have not achieved such high standards of safety performance.In setting out down the path of a behavioural safety programme, KCA DEUTAG fully realised that this work would not bear fruit overnight. The Company's senior management gave their full support and commitment to a long-term programme of safety performance improvement through detailed research and analysis into the various influences on safety performance across its operations. This would be no short-term reactive fix but a drive to get to the root of behavioural safety issues and take steps to identify and implement best practice throughout. Indeed, the belief in behavioural safety as the remaining area of focus in the triumvirate of equipment and hardware, procedures and documentation and safety culture, required firm resolve when faced with accidents and incidents which traditionally demanded some form of knee jerk reaction to satisfy client and KCA DEUTAG managers' expectations alike. The fact that the work commenced in 1998 and continues in 2003 is evidence of this long-term commitment.Behavioural Safety Programme 1998–2003. Clearly KCA DEUTAG's behavioural safety programme did not just suddenly start in 1998. Many of the concepts had been used in the past, for example, the KCA DEUTAG Toolbox Talk and Risk Identification Card (TRIC) was developed in 1997 with significant input from the workforce and has proved to be one of the Company's most effective risk management tools, encouraging leadership, communication and workforce involvement.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it