Bibliographic record
Abstract
Cheaper transportation, faster communication, and lowered trade barriers have made people, firms, and their assets much more mobile. This increasing mobility has strained traditional notions that laws operate within geographic borders. Instead, some nations find their laws powerless to control or regulate behavior, while others pass laws that have profound effects on assets and activities worldwide. Today, states increasingly act as hawkers of legal rules in a market for law where people and firms often can shop for those regimes that they find most desirable. A California resident can incorporate her shipping business in Delaware, register her ships in Panama, hire her employees from Hong Kong, place her earnings in an asset-protection trust formed in the Cayman Islands, and enter into a same-sex marriage in Massachusetts or Canada, and in doing so, she can enjoy the California sunshine while at least potentially avoiding many facets of the state's laws. The law market carries the promise of improving our lives as well as the quality of the laws that govern us because it helps to discipline interest group attempts to pass laws that impose costs on society. But the law market also threatens governments' ability to protect its citizens from harmful private conduct. Given this trade-off, the book argues that simple contractual choice-of-law rules can help maximize the beneficial effects of the law market while tempering its costs. This approach often is superior to attempts to federalize legal rules in the United States or to harmonize legal rules across nations. Moreover, lawmakers have powerful incentives to enforce parties' bargains regarding the applicable law in order to attract or retain mobile firms and residents. The book shows how their insights and recommendations apply across a wide variety of legal problems, including corporate governance, securities, franchise, trust, property, marriage, living will, surrogacy, and general contract regulations. This book therefore provides a useful template for analyzing the role of law in an increasingly mobile world.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".