Cooperative advertising in a closed-loop supply chain to encourage customers to return their used products
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, two non-cooperatives and one cooperative game are established in order to investigate the effectiveness of cooperative advertising in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. In a closed-loop supply chain, companies tend to increase the return rate of used products. Therefore, the retailer spends for green advertising in order to encourage customers to return their used products by increasing their concerns and awareness about environmental issues. On the other hand, the manufacturer spends on national advertising to create an image of the product and enhance its sale. Since in the manufacturer's point of view, remanufacturing used products is more profitable than manufacturing new ones, he prefers to give some incentives such as participating in the retailer's green advertising expenditure and paying return costs per unit of returned products to the retailer to collect more used products. Results show that both channel members spend their highest and lowest advertising expenditures in cooperative and Nash game, respectively. Also, the higher the differences between the costs of manufacturing new and remanufacturing used products, the more willing the manufacturer is to participate in the retailer's green advertising expenditure.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".