A Pricing Mechanism for Ride-Hailing Systems in the Presence of Driver Acceptance Uncertainty
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Freelance drivers in ride-hailing systems may strategically accept or reject ride requests based on their projection of the profitability of the assigned rides. This driver acceptance uncertainty is mainly caused by the flat rate payment and the blind ride acceptance rule adopted by most ride-hailing platforms. As a result, a high driver rejection rate has been observed, causing a negative impact on the service quality and matching efficiency for the ride-hailing systems. In this paper, we propose a pricing mechanism to improve drivers’ average ride acceptance rate by offering personalized payments computed based on the characteristics of individual riders and the estimated acceptance rates of the drivers. Specifically, we model and predict the drivers’ ride acceptance rates through a binary choice model and incorporate it into the stochastic optimization problem for the ride-hailing system. This provides personalized payment for each driver in connection with the characteristics of the assigned ride and the preferences of the drivers. We then evaluate the performance of the proposed pricing mechanism through extensive numerical experiments based on RideAustin trip data from June 2016 to April 2017. The results suggest that our proposed pricing mechanism improves the drivers’ average acceptance rate by an average of 60% compared to some commonly used pricing schemes. It also significantly increases the platform’s expected profit and matching rate.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".