Optimal subsidy strategies in a smart supply chain driven by dual innovation
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Due to the deep integration of modern information technology, supply chain management has moved into a new stage of a smart supply chain. Considering the dual smart innovation of the manufacturer's production and retailer’s service, the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is constructed in the smart supply chain. Under the single and coordinated government subsidy strategies, the optimal decisions of the smart supply chain are researched, and the impacts of manufacturers' risk aversion on the government subsidy strategies and supply chain decisions are analysed. In addition, the efficiencies of different government subsidy strategies are compared and analysed by numerical simulation. Finally, the results show that: (i) The moderate risk aversion by the manufacturer can improve social welfare and help provide consumers with more affordable products. (ii) The government expenditure and product prices are highest under the coordinated subsidy strategy. (iii) Subsidising manufacturers is more beneficial than subsidising retailers among the two single government subsidy strategies. (iv) In general, the coordinated government subsidy strategy is more effective than the single subsidy strategy for the innovative development of a smart supply chain. In conclusion, the research provides a significant practical reference for jointly building the smart supply chain.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".