Does Collaborative Editing Help Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities in Crowd-Shared IoT Code Examples?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Background: With the proliferation of crowd-sourced developer forums, Software developers are increasingly sharing more coding solutions to programming problems with others in forums. The decentralized nature of knowledge sharing on sites has raised the concern of sharing security vulnerable code, which then can be reused into mission critical software systems - making those systems vulnerable in the process. Collaborative editing has been introduced in forums like Stack Overflow to improve the quality of the shared contents. Aim: In this paper, we investigate whether code editing can mitigate shared vulnerable code examples by analyzing IoT code snippets and their revisions in three Stack Exchange sites: Stack Overflow, Arduino, and Raspberry Pi. Method:We analyze the vulnerabilities present in shared IoT C/C++ code snippets, as C/C++ is one of the most widely used languages in mission-critical devices and low-powered IoT devices. We further analyse the revisions made to these code snippets, and their effects. Results: We find several vulnerabilities such as CWE 788 - Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer , in 740 code snippets. However, we find the vast majority of posts are not revised, or revisions are not made to the code snippets themselves (598 out of 740). We also find that revisions are most likely to result in no change to the number of vulnerabilities in a code snippet rather than deteriorating or improving the snippet. Conclusions: We conclude that the current collaborative editing system in the forums may be insufficient to help mitigate vulnerabilities in the shared code.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".