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Record W4301239203 · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0909.0892

Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions

2009· preprint· en· W4301239203 on OpenAlexaff
Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin

Bibliographic record

VenuearXiv (Cornell University) · 2009
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPrice of anarchyCommon value auctionNash equilibriumMathematical economicsCombinatorial auctionGreedy algorithmEconomicsPrice of stabilityUpper and lower boundsMathematical optimizationMicroeconomicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium, the resulting price of anarchy bound is close to the approximation factor of the underlying greedy algorithm.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.086
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.053

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.086
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0030.006
Scholarly communication0.0080.013
Open science0.0030.004
Research integrity0.0050.008
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.316
GPT teacher head0.297
Teacher spread0.018 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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