Financial incentives to promote employment of persons with disabilities: a scoping review of when and how they work best
Bibliographic record
Abstract
PURPOSE: To assess the state of evidence on the use of financial incentives to employ, retain, and promote persons with disabilities. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We completed a scoping review of the peer-reviewed literature published from 1990 to 31 March 2022. Inclusion criteria were - populations with a disability; employment, retention, or promotion; and use of financial incentives targeted at employers. Articles were excluded if incentive was targeted solely at persons with disabilities. RESULTS: Seventeen articles met the inclusion criterion and were collated based on their study designs, type of incentive investigated, employment sector, and jurisdiction. We identified seven common themes that are relevant contextual and situational factors associated with the use of financial incentives to employ, retain, and promote persons with disabilities. CONCLUSIONS: While the literature identified the fact that financial incentives are widely used, the current state of the literature is modest and insufficient to make strong statements about the evidence on how and when financial incentives work well or do not work well. The themes identified allude to a subset of contextual factors requiring consideration for incentive use; however, evaluative research is still required to substantiate best practices for their use.Implications for rehabilitationFinancial incentives for the recruitment, retention, and promotion of workers with disabilities take many different forms and can incent different behaviours based on their form and context.Workers with disabilities are as diverse as workers without disabilities, consequently the supports required will differ from situation to situation.In some cases, a worker with a disability may require several types of supports, at a point in time, or over their employment journey.Employer knowledge and experience are important considerations in the use of financial incentives, as are employer skills in recruitment, retention, and promotion of workers with disabilities.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".