Nietzsche, Trump, and the Social Practices of Valuing Truth

the slogans of social movements are often put forward as simple truths, so that advocacy has consisted in changing social conditions such that these new truth claims are accepted as true: that women's rights are human rights, that black lives matter. Social movements critical of the political ascendance of Donald Trump, however, have been concerned not merely with this or that truth claim, but with the status—epistemological, social, and political—of truth itself. Those examining this post-truth moment have often turned to Friedrich Nietzsche, who for many is synonymous with the kind of postmodern conception of truth at the center of post-truth politics. However, while it is true that Nietzsche offers valuable resources for thinking about Trump and post-truth, this is not because Nietzsche gives up on truth but because he is prescient in realizing what is at stake in our esteem for it. Nietzsche's investigation of our pursuit of truth shows neither that there is no truth, nor that truth is not valuable, but that the unconditional character of the value we attribute to truth raises the specter of nihilism. Trump is a harbinger of this nihilism because he so brazenly flaunts our shared social practices of valuing truth. Since Nietzsche was so vexed by the issues concerning truth, which are now presented by Trump, Nietzsche's responses to these issues are a vital starting point in thinking through the challenges of the present political moment. While Trump lost his bid for re-election in 2020, the election results hardly represented a damning indictment of Trumpism, and Trump, his children, or an acolyte may run in future elections. Trumpism and the issues it raises about truth are here to stay.The argument of this paper proceeds in four parts. In Part 1, after defining post-truth, I question the claims underpinning common connections between Nietzsche and post-truth, namely, that postmodernism brought about post-truth and that Nietzsche himself was postmodern. Although I argue that Nietzsche is not straightforwardly postmodern, his critical investigations of truth and objectivity serve as important guides to understanding the esteem for truth central to modern life. In Part 2, I outline Nietzsche's conception of the will to truth, especially his attention to the specifically unconditional value attributed to truth. It is because truth is valued unconditionally that Trump's apparent ability to disregard it without consequence troubles so many, raising the specter of nihilism—the concern that our highest values are valueless. In Part 3, I show that while Nietzsche's positive accounts of truth and objectivity, in praising an active knower whose knowledge of the world is in part a function of her needs and values, make room for someone like Trump, Nietzsche at the same time offers standards for evaluating active knowers—the epistemic virtues of honesty, courage, curiosity, and responsibility—that, as I show in Part 4, Trump himself fails to live up to.Definitions of post-truth abound; the Oxford English Dictionary defines “post-truth,” its 2016 word of the year, as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”1 This definition captures much of what is important about post-truth while, however, failing to recognize the extent to which post-truth politicians such as Trump, rather than abandoning truth altogether, seek instead to alter our sense of which sources of knowledge are to be trusted and, therefore, of what passes for true. To call mainstream media “fake news,” for instance, is to rely on the possibility of real, true news. Trump does not malign truth so much as our usual practices of acquiring and assenting to it. He achieves this through a constant barrage of lies, disinformation, and attacks on expertise that contribute to and capitalize on pervasive confusion about empirical questions. It is because of this confusion that Trump can make claims that are so baldly false according to the status quo ante standards of public discourse and discovery he helped to undermine. The danger in such a situation is, as Tocqueville wrote, that “no society can prosper without such common beliefs . . . for without common ideas, there is no common action, and without common action, men may still exist, but they will not constitute a social body” (493). So I understand as part of post-truth, a situation in which members of a social body cease to share the sort of common reality grounded in widely shared facts that could motivate, inform, and constrain social action.To be sure, Trump is not the first president to lie, and he did not initiate the disintegration of our common reality. On the first point, it is a truism that all presidents lie. My claim is that Trump's novelty is found in the sheer brazenness of his lies, his seeming contempt for widely shared standards of making and defending truth claims. Presidential liars before Trump did more to pledge public loyalty to widely shared standards of acquiring truth.2 Trump, then, presents a new challenge precisely because his seeming disregard for truth more acutely puts at risk our shared commitment to it. On the second point, my position is not that Trump inaugurated the disintegration of a common reality, but, again, his sheer brazenness in undercutting it marks him out for special attention.Post-truth is often connected to postmodernism, which I define here as the view that there is no objective truth and what passes for true is wholly a function of social and historical contingencies. Connections drawn between Nietzsche, postmodernism, and post-truth often rely on two claims, both of which I argue are false. The first claim is that postmodern views of truth a for the of post-truth politics. The second claim is that Nietzsche a postmodern view of truth. an of the first claim, in Trump is often to have in an of post-truth politics. This is to him more than he has He is the not the of this for which the and especially the now in the can itself. Trump is the first postmodern it is because the has a postmodernism that an of the is on and who make claims to in about Trump it does not we more than such as claim that politicians and not and the of the its to important point of a for postmodernism is the sheer of of post-truth that the postmodern in the the and While the to Trump on in his rather than out of his to the character and of a is as as itself. before Trump about the the The in to the of a in a that of and the of by as an of of a political of and these important of post-truth to it that postmodernism was a for the of post-truth, we can still that who post-truth and postmodernism rely on a of such as postmodern to be for a view of truth, in reality, they are have as to a of truth rather than The postmodern investigation of truth was not a political that and to of postmodernism have been of the it the that truth is not objective and that what passes for true is a function of social and historical the to a that to this so we through our situation be second claim often by who connections between Nietzsche, postmodernism, and post-truth is that Nietzsche's view of truth is a postmodern However, we understand postmodernism as to the that there is no objective truth, Nietzsche is not straightforwardly Nietzsche, it is is in truth, critical of of truth and objectivity, and of a many beliefs to be true by his at by On the of Nietzsche in truth, has a conception of objective truth, truth claims, and views be sure, there are in Nietzsche that can to the view that Nietzsche that there is no such as a shared reality of Nietzsche for instance, that are what there there are then, claim that Nietzsche in of the damning to in pursuit of a postmodern Nietzsche is and so is or is instance, of the offers to Nietzsche's Nietzsche the which at are facts are what there there are to to such a Nietzsche is to the that reality offers to human as it is in is that there are no such facts in but that facts out of of or that are of this in of are active of a reality out of a and by our and Since to is to is this does not that there is no objective it what objective reality is it is does not it in the is here a view of our knowledge of the has Nietzsche's of truth to view of truth about Nietzsche was with such a position through the of who brought to on the of the for a of and that the results of to be not but to our the of to this in to Nietzsche to postmodern is in making this claim, he himself to be to the of his the of Nietzsche's view is not that is so not the attributed to Nietzsche, to in of is to on The is but that it is an for the is not but a in the by Nietzsche that there are no are by claims in the that point in the In The Nietzsche an of a who a understanding of her situation by the and false of by and the that to it. is as up to the of and and the for true the for reality in out of The of a of the world is as an of to the Nietzsche, what was a about which he that the for a all the the of been for the of for the of was on the with and the and valuable of all the and that in the it is that Nietzsche, rather than merely that there are facts and that Nietzsche to the and social as as the such a pursuit in critical investigations of truth in and and make that Nietzsche's esteem for be by a commitment to the value of truth. Nietzsche with these in and not rather he is not about claims are true and but about what he our will to the pursuit of truth by the that truth has unconditional Nietzsche's view is that we that truth has unconditional value because that that about the of human life. In so to to however, truth has been of as Nietzsche this of an of the the of which is the who his through and for in of of his that is to have this of according to which the of human is not but for Nietzsche, in nihilism. Nietzsche, nihilism a situation in which a highest are or what is to Nietzsche about modern nihilism in is that this has been it has been our pursuit of what we value that has that Nietzsche this the of Nietzsche, our commitment to the unconditional value of truth in has through the of and the of to the discovery of the truth that there is This it that we are with a world it has for so been of as is to the of human and so we are with the nihilism that that that is, gives attention to the will to in an of in The It is the of while such as with values, with Nietzsche to show that rather than is in merely the of the of according to which the has Nietzsche that on a there is no The truth is not have been in but to such a that the the the is more than truth, and in to it has in the because is the of we have for at truth, and we truth because we it unconditional Nietzsche after the of this commitment to truth. has the argument of in which Nietzsche that the that truth is unconditionally valuable a argument or a The argument is that truth to be valued unconditionally as it has while of value to human have for Nietzsche, to value is to in an of the world is a world of and to value is to a of value than the This is Nietzsche that who are in that and sense that is by the in world than the world of and and as they this he not by the same its this our in the Nietzsche, then, the pursuit of truth as more of the will to truth that values truth at the of life. This is a argument for Nietzsche, modern is by its view of claims as unconditional and a view that the of argument for the value of truth is in the human are by the truth about the false beliefs will and true beliefs will and so we are concerned about our we in to value to is to Nietzsche the argument for the value of truth as it straightforwardly the of he as to human The however, to this it is concerned with our is by the extent to which our beliefs the truth. However, Nietzsche's view is that the argument on to in the true beliefs will serve human is to that the world is to human that there is between human needs and the the world we that we in the world for that we are its of is that an could to that he in concerning the of true have that Nietzsche that our in truth is in The will to truth that truth is a of this then, that truth claims, they as views are in and so To this is to that they and serve and its values and of such a claim that will be especially important for our is the claim of to Nietzsche that such a is “no of no but rather a and of with which make to the of the modern before the is no in that no than we of a of Nietzsche as by the of are drawn to a view of a of not through but because are by a view of reality according to which and are by this truth claim has in common with the more to truth by the will to truth is the value to the of the knower with to as the to the to truth, and the gives an of a world all to the of to the of to a that of the view of truth Nietzsche and truth has an of to a world to and by the of the The knower to what is, and the of her Since our are of our and truth has been in to our truth has been as or on marks all by the knower as an to acquiring truth. Nietzsche the as at of all in the pursuit of truth for Nietzsche, to is to Nietzsche claims that in the world is an a and in all and is a new an by of which the and of or in the This for Nietzsche, our conception of objective truth, it on and that of according to which the has and and all that it view is that Nietzsche's of the will to truth important about the to Trump and the character of at his and that Nietzsche's positive view offers the of a more to Trump's disregard for the truth is so precisely because truth such a in our to Trump the specter of the nihilism that so vexed Nietzsche, the of in what we we are with the discovery that that value has been Trump can lie, and with truth is not so we have so much value in truth and so much that to up its value be to up our of for who we are and what to of the concern about Trump's is in of the argument for valuing truth that truth in is important because to about and the reality of political at in to make which politicians and to what politicians have to about the true of the can and to and in the for and is, we not practices of esteem for truth, human will However, as Nietzsche to that human that we be in of the truth is to that the world is so as to serve human a view that human with a in This is a commitment has to to by human to Trump's ability to without consequence this such as make to the of of the of post-truth politics. the is to our and in we may or about reality has the This claim can be as an of the will to truth according to which truth is valuable it puts with of the world of human about Trump's to the is of This Although Trump can to or about the and reality of a and its are to However, with Nietzsche, we that such claims concerning the of reality our are a of that more of an world in to the human and with the of values that in nihilism. Trump's are because they put at risk a commitment that has been to namely, that human who seek truth can put in with a world than the merely human who are of Trump are drawn to the that Trump may in and it will be the as Trump's are to up with there to be for Trump for his because we is by the same Nietzsche, however, we that our commitment to this is not in a in the truth, but in the who make of brought by a of to which we are all Trump is active we value we value While what we him is to to the truth, Trump brazenly offers his truths, while his about the that not in the Nietzsche is that we not to be by the values that the will to truth, and I that important of the to Trump are in that new for that be Nietzsche's positive view of truth and objectivity can for Nietzsche, the will to truth is in of truth as and valuing truth all it to the world of human as Nietzsche, what is is a of the world that that world with the kind of that could make human such that the pursuit of truth could be an of rather as with the will to truth, is the view that Nietzsche in the and that he himself to be through the of he in his we have with we all still have in our a view of reality, a the and the for the all the of for more than two on of a a sense of and as sort of of the as a with the of a as as as a as reality . . . of this in a in the pursuit of truth will that the knower In Nietzsche offers a of objectivity that accounts for the by the knower to what is and, in so our in our pursuit of Nietzsche an objectivity, not as is a and but rather as the to have and in and to in and so that to make precisely the in and for objectivity in of or that there be no the of her or It is a view of and so up in that of of the will to truth that value in the Nietzsche's view is that such an of is as it Nietzsche an objectivity that room for the of the Nietzsche now the that a of the of such as in here it is that we an that be an that not have in which the active and through which first are to are to be what is here is an and a of an is a a and the more we to about a the more we to to on and the same that much more will our of this our in the as an but it is not the of a than the and objectivity and than through we through as many human as as many Nietzsche of new who are to through the of human values and value and to be to with many and a and the a in the Nietzsche, human knowledge out of the of a with her To an is not to but to to and to the between objectivity, then, puts with reality, but it is not reality of as Nietzsche, to of reality in such a is to rely on a between reality and true world and Nietzsche so as to the of as a of views on this in his Nietzsche of the between reality and true world is which world is The . . . we of the world with the true in the Nietzsche's view is that he has our conception of by that it is a function of the will to truth and so a to about the of rather than to that and, a that has the of the world valueless. However, Nietzsche that what is we such a conception of the world is not an apparent to of an is to the itself. of an apparent there is a new reality. this new reality is in the same as the apparent are now in the will to truth that found no value in the at this point, be concerned that Nietzsche objectivity out of an objectivity that does not is of no we a conception of objectivity is an argument a claim that is true not for this or that but for all for Nietzsche, to an argument is to to be to that that is and so we to of such Nietzsche that we to with as active that is as whose needs and values the world they of defending Nietzsche's I now to argue that it on a more in to Trump's post-truth politics. Nietzsche's view of truth and objectivity still to be of Trump, but they are by the will to truth. Nietzsche, there are truths, but with unconditional value will not make important in Nietzsche's positive but in truth, we no seek to the and we and objectivity that we on as many as we and have an in the the will to truth make room for the of To more about the world is not to the of a but to more to and more and more of in and through In so our pursuit of truth as it is an rather than of the values of positive the of the knower and so the knower not on the of is for but by the values that and her active Nietzsche's to the values of the knower in two the values that the of her the values in the positive of reality that puts In the first that the values of Nietzsche's new pursuit of truth are and The Nietzsche is a kind of truth that of the knower about her pursuit of truth. that recognize the character of her and so recognize that the beliefs to be true are of her and and call for To the of to to our objectivity, is not to and the and of the but is rather to and by truth that put our beliefs at then, is to truth it of such as the of false beliefs that serve of our In truth, we put our at risk as we put our about what is true and what has Nietzsche that of truth is the The and pursuit of truth is a of by curiosity, an in rather than truth. the will to truth values truth because its about is a of pursuit as it values, rather than the of the truth and for the of and new of thinking and To these I Although Nietzsche is critical of of he a positive of that the honesty, curiosity, and of the to in in what does to the Nietzsche value and in with much and many could and could his in the is important to that for Nietzsche, of these courage, curiosity, and because it a of the world that not the and of truth but instead the and of the and so as a of the values of as with the will to truth, in to that the risk of nihilism is that the pursuit of what we value that in the of truth, that the pursuit of truth the value of truth. This kind of nihilism is a as as we to what we value and to the of value we to it Nietzsche's epistemic especially courage, the for what is is precisely the pursuit of that seek the that truth can not because truth is but because is is because it is of values, and to live is to which for Nietzsche, to with the values of life. the reality to rather than her the knower that as a of Nietzsche's virtues to the of the in such active Nietzsche who the to truth in of It is to this that many claim that the public to the of a is to However, the to Trump's is not not the to a world of in the of which Trump be This is by the in Trump's as he of as rather that the with Trump is not that he lies, but that he is in Nietzsche's He the of an knower who the and character of what He the to question and the of what he as a kind of of that Nietzsche by much truth can a much truth is it to in the Trump is of the truth and will for it. the of the for instance, he was of Trump's so many for the to and we have more Trump is in the of reality and truth that put him at than Trump is a in the sense Nietzsche has in he that not is in the Trump is a not because he will not before but because he will not in the sort of of the knower out by Nietzsche as and Trump is of curiosity, and of out and more than namely, his sense of his He is of of and because he is to or about his and The with Trump is not his but his Trump is to on and but his and so much of what is epistemic virtues are the in which to Trump's active The second the world Trump On we not Trump merely because he is an but because the world he through his is a Nietzsche not according to they are but they are Nietzsche of for instance, that the it to the the is to The that are in is my to its in the he that is now is our no our is to human it false. is, that an of the and value of is in is not in an to we it according to what sort of world it is because it has brought a world of human with and in Nietzsche's while it is the of this paper to the in which the world Trump offers is a we a that Trump offers a world of of and by a for that serve to our to live which is to the world and through to make the world as he on the active character of human Nietzsche to the for someone like However, that is part of the for Nietzsche offers an of what it is to as an active a that Trump Nietzsche a of truth as that has to be for and in its is less than social an to reality, to up to truths, and to on the of for contribute to the Nietzsche's can a society by an to truth. Nietzsche to that the truth will not it is up to to make and it

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