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Record W4307210183 · doi:10.1108/mf-01-2022-0059

Gender diversity and bank risk-taking: female directors and executives

2022· article· en· W4307210183 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueManagerial Finance · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsWilfrid Laurier UniversityTrinity Western UniversityWestern University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsGender diversityAccountingBusinessExecutive compensationEquity (law)IncentiveEmpirical evidenceSystematic riskBalance sheetCorporate governanceEconomicsFinancePolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Purpose The authors investigate how a gender-diverse board, a gender-diverse executive team, or a female chief executive officer (CEO) impact bank balance sheet and equity risk. Design/methodology/approach Using panel data of U.S. bank holding companies over the period of 1992–2019, the authors conduct panel regressions with bank and year-fixed effects to analyze how female directors, female executives, and female CEOs impact a wide range of bank risk measures, controlling for the bank, board and executive characteristics. Findings The authors find female directors significantly reduce all types of risk. Female executives reduce some balance sheet risk but have an insignificant effect on bank equity risk. However, the presence of female CEOs does not significantly reduce bank risk-taking. During financial crises, female CEOs even increase equity risk. Social implications The findings are important to shed light on the ongoing debate on how gender quota policy could be efficiently used to balance the need for gender diversity while ensuring corporate performance. It could also improve social welfare by guiding proper public policy to ensure the efficient use of social labor capital and curb banks' excessive risk-taking incentives. Originality/value The authors provide the first empirical evidence demonstrating that female directors and female executives in the banking industry have different impacts on bank risk-taking. The authors also provide the first empirical evidence that female leaders have a different impact on two different types of risks: balance sheet and equity risk. The study is also the first to analyze the impact of female executives over multiple financial crises.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.168
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.002
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.026
GPT teacher head0.201
Teacher spread0.175 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it