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Record W4317210754 · doi:10.1111/caje.12635

Morale, performance and disclosure

2023· article· en· W4317210754 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Xu Jiang, Ying Xue

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 2023
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommunication sourceTask (project management)Pareto principleTransparency (behavior)MicroeconomicsOutcome (game theory)Pareto optimalMonotonic functionEconomicsComputer scienceComputer securityComputer networkSet (abstract data type)Operations managementMathematicsManagement

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto‐dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto‐optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non‐monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade‐off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.034
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.054

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.034
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.005
Scholarly communication0.0050.004
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0030.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.165
GPT teacher head0.234
Teacher spread0.069 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2023
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économiqueSame topicExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesFrench-language works237,207