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Record W4319338973 · doi:10.1101/2023.02.06.526214

No Evidence in Favour of the Existence of ‘Intentional’ Binding

2023· preprint· en· W4319338973 on OpenAlexaff
Gaiqing Kong, Cheryne Aberkane, Clément Desoche, Alessandro Farnè, Marine Vernet

Bibliographic record

VenuebioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · 2023
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicFree Will and Agency
Canadian institutionsImmersion (Canada)
FundersFondation FyssenAgence Nationale de la Recherche
KeywordsSense of agencyVoluntary actionSensory systemPsychologyAction (physics)Agency (philosophy)PredictabilityFeelingCognitive psychologyTime perceptionPerceptionSocial psychologyNeuroscienceMathematicsEpistemologyStatistics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Intentional binding refers to the subjective temporal compression between a voluntary action and its sensory outcome. Despite some studies having challenged the link between temporal compression and intentional action, the intentional binding is still widely used as an implicit measure for the sense of agency. The debate remains unsettled primarily because the experimental conditions used in previous studies were confounded with various alternative causes for temporal compression, and action intention has not yet been tested comprehensively against all potential alternative causes in a single study. Here, we solve this puzzle by jointly comparing participants’ estimates of the interval between three types of triggering events with comparable predictability - voluntary movement, passive movement, external sensory event - and an external sensory outcome (auditory or visual across experiments). Results failed to show intentional binding, i.e., no shorter interval estimation for the voluntary than the passive movement conditions. Instead, we observed temporal (but not intentional) binding when comparing both movement conditions to the external sensory condition. Thus, temporal binding seems to originate from sensory integration and temporal prediction, not from action intention. As such, these findings underscore the need to reconsider the use of "intentional binding" as a reliable proxy of the sense of agency. Public Significance Statement When we press a light switch and observe a bulb lightening, we experience a sense of agency, a feeling of control over these events. We also estimate the temporal interval between our voluntary action and its consequence shorter than the same interval between two events in which we are not involved. Such temporal binding has thus been taken as a measure of the sense of agency. However, our study reveals that voluntary actions are neither necessary, nor sufficient for temporal binding. Instead, temporal binding relies on predicting and integrating information. The sense of agency can be disturbed in various psychiatric disorders and its brain mechanisms are currently actively explored. Our study urges amending how it is measured.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.079
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.013
Threshold uncertainty score0.043

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.079
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.003
Scholarly communication0.0020.003
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.083
GPT teacher head0.265
Teacher spread0.182 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations6
Published2023
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venuebioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory)Same topicFree Will and AgencyFrench-language works237,207