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Record W4323646088 · doi:10.1109/fnwf55208.2022.00117

SliceSecure: Impact and Detection of DoS/DDoS Attacks on 5G Network Slices

2022· article· en· W4323646088 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection
Canadian institutionsUniversity of WaterlooUniversity of Regina
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDenial-of-service attackComputer scienceTrinooApplication layer DDoS attackComputer networkNetwork securityLatency (audio)The InternetOperating systemTelecommunications

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

5G Network slicing is one of the key enabling technologies that offer dedicated logical resources to different applications on the same physical network. However, a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack can severely damage the performance and functionality of network slices. Furthermore, recent DoS/DDoS attack detection techniques are based on the available data sets which are collected from simulated 5G networks rather than from 5G network slices. In this paper, we first show how DoS/DDoS attacks on network slices can impact slice users' performance metrics such as bandwidth and latency. Then, we present a novel DoS/DDoS attack dataset collected from a simulated 5G network slicing test bed. Finally, we showed a deep-learning-based bidirectional LSTM (Long Short Term Memory) model, namely, SliceSecure can detect DoS/DDoS attacks with an accuracy of 99.99% on the newly created data sets for 5G network slices.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.812
Threshold uncertainty score0.432

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.010
GPT teacher head0.244
Teacher spread0.234 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations42
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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