Contractualist alternatives to the veil of ignorance

Some of the strongest criticisms of the original position have come from contractualists sympathetic to egalitarianism. In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” Thomas Scanlon objected that, without special assumptions, choice under uncertainty justifies maximizing the average rather than the minimum, and is thus compatible with the least advantaged suffering serious avoidable hardship. Yet Scanlon also argued that the difference principle is unreasonably strict in its single-minded focus on raising the least advantaged position without regard to the size of forgone benefits in other parts of the distribution.1 Scanlon went on to develop a contractualist theory of moral obligation, not of social justice.2 More recently, he has discussed the reasons for objecting to economic inequality, defending a “weaker” version of the difference principle.3 Yet, as Jacob Barrett has argued,4 Scanlon is not entirely clear about the content of his alternate principle. Nor has he explained exactly how it is derived from the requirement of invulnerability to reasonable rejection. Others have worked out what has become known as the “complaint model” of reasonable rejection, building on Scanlon's suggestions about how we might accommodate a limited form of aggregation while preserving the main thrust of contractualism's individualism.5 However, this model has been developed primarily in the context of moral rather than political philosophy, with a focus on problems of rescue, not decisions about the basic structure of a political society. The result is that there still isn't a Scanlonian theory of justice. One rough test of whether you regard a justification as sufficient is whether you would accept that justification if you were in another person's position. This connection between the idea of “changing places” and the motivation which underlies morality explains the frequent occurrence of “Golden Rule” arguments within different systems of morality and in the teachings of various religions.6 Choice from behind a veil of ignorance forces one to imagine what it would be like to be in someone else's disadvantaged position, but it also permits one to gamble—for the sake of a greater expectation—that one is unlikely to end up in that position. The complaint model of reasonable rejection requires not only that I consider your situation, but that I withdraw my own complaint if it is (much) smaller than yours.7 Since everyone in my position should do the same, it won't matter if there are more of us in my position than in yours. The complaint model is subject to a number of objections, but I will argue that most of them do not arise with respect to choices about the design of the basic structure of society, assessed in terms of the lifetime prospects associated with different social positions. As the basis for a theory of distributive justice, however, the complaint model is insufficiently egalitarian. Minimizing the maximum complaint does disallow many relatively trivial gains higher up in the spectrum of advantage from outweighing one serious loss lower down. However, once we relax lexical priority, the complaint model can also prevent many smaller gains lower down from outweighing one larger loss at the top end. The article develops an egalitarian alternative to the complaint model, based on a competing account of role reversal. Instead of asking a person to withdraw their complaint when it is not close enough in size to the biggest complaint, we can ask them whether they would be willing to insist upon their complaint regardless of which position they were to occupy in the alternative that would obtain were their complaint accepted as decisive. This invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection yields something like the difference principle, the exact formulation depending on what kind of prima facie complaints we permit. It doesn't yield any way of watering down the strictness the principle assigns to benefiting the least advantaged, although in the special case of collective decisions about the basic structure of society, this strictness is more plausible than it seems. Section I interprets Scanlon's recent discussion of economic fairness in light of his earlier critique of Rawls. Here, I use the single-biggest complaint model to respond to Barrett's criticism that if Scanlon rejects maximin, he must accept that greater aggregate benefits can justify extra inequality that doesn't benefit everyone. Section II argues that the main criticisms of the complaint model aren't relevant in the context of distributive justice, but that this model is insufficiently egalitarian. Section III develops the invariant complaint model, and explores whether it is too restrictive of aggregation. One of the distinctive features of the difference principle is the strictness it attaches to raising the least advantaged social position, even (1) by small amounts at the of greater in other and even for at the of more in other positions. of that inequality should benefit but the difference principle on the The principle permits that must not the least The that if the the is while the the that when the of the position is the is In the difference principle assigns lexical to raising the position raising higher positions. even a of for is smaller than a loss of for even a of for is smaller than of for and The difference principle thus aggregation at different The strictness of this if we are benefits by social However, when there are more than and the of that extra inequality that the position will lower as in the case of that everyone benefit from inequality would maximizing the minimum, in this but that the should have a gains for the the difference principle primarily to collective choices about the basic structure of a political society, based on the lifetime of different social positions. The principle aggregation with respect to different of The and are from the of of the of different while on aggregation it unlikely that the difference principle would be from behind a veil of argued that choice under uncertainty about position would to maximizing average Yet this principle the least advantaged in serious avoidable hardship. this result by the of even the that they an of them to use the of Yet he by the that the choice must be to not Scanlon that choice under uncertainty that are other of the original that one can only one would be willing to come what of and that of are it would be to if in were to be by The is not what it would be for an to if about their position, but what can be accepted without from any position, on the of to from of the the is a however, between from any and to the least advantaged their rejection of contractualist the strictness of the difference principle. that gains for the should be to gains for the it to a of depending on the at which the gains also argued that at must a choice between (1) for a and but still for that as while as and that there are a more in than in In a it might be to even it doesn't the Scanlon at least with respect to aggregation to the of the but does not us to their it on how the least advantaged and how the gains of someone in this position to the of the of higher of what position they will but that they have an of might on a principle that on while a small in The under this Scanlon if there were an alternative in which one be even if this alternative a lower average Yet the complaint of the under still to be the complaint of would do under Scanlon the are not and small gains for them will to for higher the complaint of the not be decisive. if we accept that for we might at this higher doesn't if one is to the loss of from to isn't enough to justify the from to that the difference principle to to which a of for the to gains for the that arise when are In Scanlon a version of the difference inequality can be of its as as its in when it from an economic that is as by the recent in inequality in One about inequality is that it to political Yet based on the of inequality to account for the many have that the recent in inequality is in from it social is Scanlon when it account the of a greater in the of not be but person's must be One of fairness is difference principle, which Scanlon in terms of the version of the basic structure is only if the it are to the advantage of in the social which is to only if any in inequality would the of the of the least advantaged However, Scanlon on to that many to the they do not accept as as Scanlon's is that in for a basic structure to be must be without basic in for the economic to in a way that benefits which he relatively of the idea that must be to is requires that a that must not only benefit but must benefit have as as The of principle as that we benefit the as as that Scanlon might be from the of the difference principle, in of an In that however, Scanlon would be defending a principle that is more egalitarian than in that it permits us to in the position for the sake of greater in the the version of the principle permits us to and as as the of principle as that inequality must benefit the as to benefiting everyone that Scanlon might be that extra inequality not the least that would Scanlon's alternative principle more egalitarian rather than connection that extra inequality rather than the can us to a more that to the minimum, as we with respect to Barrett interprets Scanlon as that inequality must benefit and that we must advantage of In other the of for with what will we any extra inequality that would benefit and we that inequality does benefit Barrett out that when connection this of is I will his as to out what I are the in an one of his This principle also in that the of on whether is a of version of the of is and are as but when is not is not for more than The is that in to justify that benefit Scanlon must to greater to Since the extra inequality of doesn't benefit the only for if is the is can this result by Scanlon as to the the difference principle assigns to benefiting the rather than to that extra inequality position. Scanlon's discussion of to the of the the gains to someone in the position the for what has become known as the complaint model of reasonable rejection. to this model, a person's complaint a principle is by their in advantage to their by the at which the person can a principle when complaint is greater than The principle is thus to the biggest to the complaint model to role in that the of own complaint of in their I that my complaint a is than your complaint the alternative that I I should withdraw my when does what is a theory that aggregation. the complaint model, the choice between and must be by the biggest which is for the position in as to a of for the position in The complaint model not on the basis of the of but on the basis that complaint is than complaint I in that there is another way of the to role reversal. In the choice between and of that should in in and withdraw their complaint it is smaller than we that if to should be willing to accept matter what position in they might isn't willing to do that, is willing to their to in of role in the The only that is invariant with respect to of in the alternative is that of to and is willing to accept the alternative come what even if they should in the least advantaged position in I will to this invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection of the single-biggest complaint model that the up on Scanlon's that aggregation might be if complaints are close in for one many of this model, we aggregate when the in a of this which he by the As in the complaint model, the size of a complaint on the size in the of advantage to by Yet is relevant if and only if it is to the strongest competing The is thus to the of if the difference between is than a but to the biggest In the single-biggest complaint, the of The of the version of the complaint model is that it the one if we have to between one from and many from a we the one from matter how many there the other if the choice is between one from and many from there will be of for which we should the many of choice between a of many of One with the single-biggest complaint model is that when to it can an an is a case based on The biggest is for in the complaint model even while This from the that the only of the many if everyone be to any the maximum for would be the The is not relevant for my I with social as a matter of by an not with the complaint model is that it will choices the size of a person's complaint a on their to how they do in their which will on what other are in the This is to if we for that the is Here, are by to the top in a The complaint model when is even of is than of complaint is to at the of from the will to a of the of The competing invariant complaint model doesn't have this to and is willing to accept position in and it doesn't matter whether is The use of a can also even in that would be of it can whether the in complaints the the case with only one person in but many in is won't has the biggest in this is than and we at however, that if the difference is than we aggregate the of the if it is to greater than we aggregate the maximum and are the difference in is for One in for in which is a of we but the biggest with the result that is however, the for the in are to at the difference in to which is the we up the of in to with the result that a reversal. not is a of is between of as in the case of it does for on whether is on the In other however, it can to in what is not the of assessed but their to other that might have been The and of the on how many other are in the but what the choice about my does there is only one I should ask if not is not The of the a when of that there is a about how they should be that we can one of and and that while are relevant to and to are not relevant to serious they are not that serious and of serious any number of of the we were serious it would be to more to than to should us to which the in the serious However, the in with serious in different and aren't relevant to while the in with in and are relevant to us for even the in the that with the serious but would be even if we to this many they are not relevant in the context of of social justice, what is at are decisions about the basic structure of based on the lifetime associated with different social positions. this we are with choices between that between but only by their in a with the single-biggest complaint model is that it be restrictive of aggregation in The of the maximum complaint we its many social but one of them with the to the person Yet the maximum complaint restrictive of we to be number of benefits from on but a small number of is by we is the number of by it not to benefit from it is and a on it would a on a out that there are to the of use of a person's in the but not in the we even if we to up a the of contractualist morality to argue that whether someone has been on the to which they were not the are based on for the of of as by to which a would have As a the moral must be that the in a under a up but the is whether he by the to its the is to and if end up their can the are not to the benefit the would were does not the complaint limited of which by would not be sufficient to the with an however, the of an aggregation the case to if one would one forgone benefit from we only argue that the difference is close and we are to main to the single-biggest complaint model, as the basis for a principle of distributive justice, is that it is insufficiently egalitarian. It of the of the model to relax the strictness that the difference principle assigns to benefiting the in in the of a small for the at the of a loss for the as in the case of even more are other however, in which the complaint to aggregation it we about is the that it will in the position, and smaller lower down in the Here, of the to in the of the and withdraw their complaint In this the complaint model extra inequality that the position of the least the complaint on aggregation to benefits to the The can arise with by one The biggest is in at while of and a of in The greater inequality of lower for the sake of an greater to the top position. Here, the complaint model extra inequality that only benefits the The the complaint model this result is that it does not lexical to gains for the advantaged, but many smaller gains lower down from outweighing one larger loss The complaint of by the at which they but does not this I have the of what In a they are of an of social and the and of to and also the of and one can in the on the lifetime of the of different positions. The moral of a of on its not to have any social in terms of to develop and moral but to have the in Scanlonian the size of a person's complaint about forgone benefits is a of the size of their and the at which it we might the moral of a of to be the of and in that in the case of although the biggest would the yields which the of in is larger than of in any of lexical priority, however, we can consider more This case is one of my original but with complaint we is still which is than of the other which are are to it the invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection. The that contractualist to aggregation are in which the of the many smaller gains higher up a larger loss lower down. of in is to be more than of the of in of the to in and withdraw their the in is the The many smaller to the more serious The is in the case of by a to the single-biggest complaint model, of and should in that in is more than in and withdraw their complaints In the complaint to aggregation inequality and benefiting the there another way to this which doesn't have the I objected to that of and to withdraw their to their to they be in one that they are only willing to if they can be not with in The invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection is by Scanlon's discussion of of the original position, and on and justice, in his of It is a idea that one of someone else's a one that in the relevant the would to as This on complaints of that we of in terms of that role reversal. The idea is to reasonable in terms of that are in of of positions. prima facie will be if the person the would be to it regardless of which position they might come to occupy in the alternative that will obtain if their is accepted as decisive. This alternate of the test yields a different result in the I discussed the should withdraw your you only to if you can be of in your position, in you is to how about withdraw my to if to with in One might that this that one can only to in in principle one also to this for for any of the other in this role not the relevant is objecting to they should be willing to that regardless of what position they end up in in the that will obtain if their is which is not the only prima facie we are about forgone the result is the version of the difference principle. in the case of can to and that they be in and is willing to regardless of what position they will occupy in that even if they in the position. In although can to they be in is not willing to that should they end up in in Scanlon that can about not about their own of of the as they are complaints about inequality that one when one is on the end of the inequality, as to complaints about the aggregate of inequality, which account positions. It will be objected that if we to inequality, we are of argue that inequality can be inequality, with respect to any of and any but of for in to we of the invariant complaint model will to maximin, we the of complaints from the of the position. In the between and has prima facie to that they be in and to that they would inequality in The is whether the for in from to is the in It plausible that it the is relatively to the in inequality, and it at a the were greater and at a higher however, that might not be a case a Here, but might that the of in is not the extra we accepted only to extra inequality, the invariant complaint model would inequality with respect to the not a plausible might accept only to extra inequality, but that gains can inequality, however, which would the version of the difference principle. are other accept prima facie to rather than to forgone benefits in might also accept complaints about inequality, but not a for between and The invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection a for the difference principle than does choice from behind a veil of what we about is to from it that complaints a should be invariant with respect to of in the In a choice between and if you to you should be to accept regardless of what position in you the complaint from the of the position will the of invariant with respect to in the The invariant complaint model has a however, which is that it is with respect to and of The single-biggest complaint model the the difference principle attaches to raising the of the position in by not complaints lower down lexical priority, and by aggregation different of when complaints are close enough in The invariant complaint model has a case I to and Scanlon's to relax lexical has prima facie to based on forgone benefits and extra The is in of role would be and inequality in position in In although has a prima facie to that they be in this does not role is not willing to their regardless of the position they will occupy in were they to occupy in they would be This version of the test strict to in the of the position for higher positions. of a are the for maximin, in the context of of social In the of social we are benefits by social the different which one can be of which a role in the of will in their of and the of position the and an can the size of the are most if we about the difference principle as a social to arise in which a can a small to a larger benefit on a to advantage of for in what come and in for the of it that about One with of the difference principle, as and is that they of social by the of their the principle is to be the of for collective decisions about the basic structure of society, based on lifetime associated with different social positions. The other case that to be a for the invariant complaint model is that of but as we of to forgone the single-biggest complaint model if we aggregation when complaints are close The invariant complaint model does not have this for and more on the case for an In the context of of distributive justice, however, the greater strictness of the invariant complaint model with respect to aggregation is of a in this context a of is The case a of the relevant positions. The to from the will be by a while the to from the to on to the of the would be for the of and It might be that in of the of the by a is more serious than the of a not to the in we one by the contractualist to position in from the however, end up in a one can do which would be It might not be too to ask not to but it would be a to ask them not to and of might be on the that might be by a by a by a are to that the of is more than the of Minimizing the maximum based on of I not but you not I might be willing to accept the of your you accept the of my More there is that the maximum associated with of the will the maximum the of distributive justice, which is my It would be to insist on the maximum for in a based on of if we in which small gains for the position by the in are associated with for higher positions. for of might be in to in not to the might be and for choice we the for the in and if in many a small for the position at the of a for higher we might end up with a position without lower than it would The main of this article has been to the of different of about role within choice under the single-biggest complaint, and complaints to be invariant with respect to of in the choice from behind a veil of ignorance requires that one in the of it also one to that one will not their The veil of ignorance won't maximin, we the the that they have an of has too the for contractualists has been to an alternate account of which a more plausible distributive principle. The single-biggest complaint model to in the of and to withdraw their own complaint if it is (much) smaller than the biggest This model can disallow many small gains on the of the from outweighing larger for the while aggregation when complaints are close in as in case of small gains to the at the of larger to the Yet the principle of the maximum complaint is insufficiently I once we relax lexical priority, this to aggregation can us to a benefit for the at the of to lower positions. The invariant complaint model of reasonable rejection for the difference principle than does choice under This model requires that one be willing to insist on complaint even in of in the that will if is accepted as decisive. This model does not any for the the difference principle assigns to benefiting the as to benefiting the Yet this strictness is more plausible than it when to lifetime of social positions. I would like to Jacob and for their on earlier of this are of relevant to this The not for this relevant are in the

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