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Record W4361029208 · doi:10.1353/sch.2001.0090

Conscience in the Court, 1931–1946: Religion as Duty and Choice

2001· article· en· W4361029208 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Jeffrey M. Anderson

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Supreme Court History · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicAmerican Constitutional Law and Politics
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsConscienceDutyLawPoliticsConstitutionCitizenshipAllegianceState (computer science)Political scienceFaithNaturalizationSociologyMilitary servicePhilosophyTheology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Conscience in the Court, 1931-1946: Religion as Duty and Choice JEFFREY M. ANDERSON That the moral duty to obey the law should be given precedence over all other moral duty is something that the majority judges read into the Constitution. The Con­ stitution says nothing about it, so it can only be imputed to the Constitution because the judges think that that is the way a good citizen should behave. Frederick Green, 19311 The theological-political problem2—the conflict of loyalties to God and state—arises in various manifestations. It arises when peo­ ple of faith engage in political action on issues ranging from abortion and most-favored-na­ tion status to homelessness and foreign aid. Historic controversies concerning Indian re­ moval, slavery, and temperance revealed ten­ sions between the demands of religious con­ victions and the duties of political citizenship. The theological-political problem seems to be highlighted during wartime, when the govern­ ment calls upon its citizens to take up arms in military conflict. Throughout American his­ tory, Congress and the courts have considered the unique difficulty posed by religious objec­ tion to military service. The same basic difficulty has been pre­ sented in naturalization cases, because federal law requires applicants for citizenship to dem­ onstrate their allegiance to the state and their commitment to its preservation. An applicant for citizenship must demonstrate that he “has been and still is a person of good moral char­ acter, attached to the principles of the Consti­ tution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.”3 Further, he must take an oath of alle­ giance, swearing, in part, “to bear arms on be­ half of the United States when required by the law.”4 Since 1952, the statute has provided certain exemptions from this particular re­ quirement for bona fide religious objectors.5 Thus, the law remains to this day concerned with the theological-political problem in the naturalization context. 26 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY Consider a recent case. In 1992, a fed­ eral district court in Tennessee denied the cit­ izenship petition of Mahmoud Kassas, a Syr­ ian man, on the ground that he was not “attached to the principles of the Constitu­ tion.”6 This conclusion followed from Kassas’ unwillingness to swear in advance that he would personally bear arms in any fu­ ture wars. Kassas was a Muslim, and the court found that “he thought he would be condemned to hell” if he killed, or was killed by, another Muslim.7 The Government ar­ gued, and the court agreed, that Kassas could not avail himself of the religious-objector ex­ emptions, because he was opposed to only some wars.8 Under an earlier Supreme Court ruling, such selective opposition to military activity is insufficient to warrant exemption from the oath.9 The court in this case confronted a prob­ lem basic to politics for centuries: Someone has to decide what exactly belongs to Caesar. However, the manner in which American courts approach this problem has changed during the course of the twentieth century. In the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II, the Supreme Court decided a series of naturalization cases involving applicants for citizenship who had refused to swear that they would take up arms personally in any future war.10 The question presented in those cases was whether such applicants could be “at­ tached to the principles of the Constitution” as required by the federal naturalization stat­ ute.11 In three cases between 1929 and 1931, the Court held that such applicants were not so attached, and it denied their petitions for citizenship.12 Two of these applicants argued that their religious convictions forbade their making blanket assurances that they would bear arms personally in any and all wars in which the United States might engage in the future. Douglas Macintosh was a Baptist preacher who served as a chaplain in World War I. Marie Bland was the daughter of an Episcopa­ lian priest who herself had served as a nurse TWO PACIFISTS WIN RICHTTOCITIZENSHIP Dr. Macintosh and Miss Bland, War Nurse, Win Reversal of Citizenship Ban. BOTH CANADIAN VETERANS Appeals...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.712
Threshold uncertainty score0.630

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.002
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.296
Teacher spread0.266 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2001
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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