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Record W4366809523 · doi:10.1353/rss.2014.0019

The Structure, Semantics, and Use of Descriptions

2014· article· en· W4366809523 on OpenAlexvenueaboutno aff
Jolen Galaugher

Bibliographic record

VenueRussell the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldPsychology
TopicPhilosophy and Theoretical Science
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPropositionLinguisticsMeaning (existential)Proper nounNounComputer scienceSemantics (computer science)PhilosophyFeature (linguistics)Philosophy of languageNoun phraseOrthodoxyEpistemologyArtificial intelligenceNatural language processingProgramming languageMetaphysics

Abstract

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russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 34 (summer 2014): 67–78 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036–01631; online 1913–8032 c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM aiscussion THE STRUCTURE, SEMANTICS, AND USE OF DESCRIPTIONS Jolen Galaugher Philosophy / McMaster U. Hamilton, on, Canada l8s 4l6 jolenb1@gmail.com / galaugjb@mcmaster.ca he division of designators into denoting expressions and referring expressions has become a familiar feature of the Russellian orthodoxy in the philosophy of language. At a glance, expressions of the referring kind seem to be unstructured, lacking independently meaningful proper parts, while those of the denoting kind seem to be structured quantifiers, having molecular complexity. Most examples fit this pattern: proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives are unstructured, while definite descriptions and other quanti fier phrases are typically structured. On Russell’s 1903 theory of denoting, the semantic structure (independently meaningful proper parts) of denoting complexes had proved a source of difficulty for his logic of propositions. The early theory was not only incapable of explaining both how we are supposed to designate complex meanings and how complex meanings are supposed to denote, but was also at odds with the view that proposition and constituent are logically basic, introducing further functional complexes into the propositional complex. Russell’s 1905 theory of descriptions reconstrued these apparently structured referring expressions as quantified noun phrases. On the new theory, knowing the meaning of such expressions does not require acquaintance with a specific object, but rather a grasp of the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur.1 One might say that on the new theory, denoting is linked to object-independent truth-conditions, while referring is linked to object-dependent truth-conditions—a connection elaborated and extended by Kripke and Kaplan. This is the situation as Arthur Sullivan paints it in his new book, Reference and Structure in the Philosophy of Language: a Defense of the 1 Russell articulated the dichotomy in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1911), ML, p. 226; Papers 6: 158. For Sullivan’s use of this passage, see his anthology, Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 79–80, and Reference and Structure in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 13–14, 137, 140 n.15. q= 68 Discussion c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM Russellian Orthodoxy (2013). In this work, Arthur Sullivan defends a stronger set of claims than the denoting /referring distinction might historically have entailed. Building on Neale’s sharp distinction between semantically unstructured rigid referring expressions and semantically structured restricted quantifiers,2 Sullivan takes it to be crucial that these categories are exhaustive and exclusive, so that all and only referring expressions are unstructured designators, and all and only denoting expressions are structured designators (p. 13). Adopting a distinction from Bach,3 Sullivan maintains that the semantic mechanism of referring designators is simply to conventionally relate the utterance of the designator to the designatum, and hence to express object-dependent propositions, while the semantic mechanism of denoting designators is satisfactional, expressing a compositional condition which may or may not be satisfied by any object and which thus expresses object-independent propositions (p. 11). In Part 1, Sullivan articulates the orthodox theory of reference in terms of these two exhaustive and exclusive categories of designator and the distinct, corresponding semantic mechanisms by which they designate. In Part 2, he provides arguments in favour of the orthodoxy. In Part 3, he deals with apparent counter -examples, reinterpreting complex demonstratives and referential uses of definite descriptions to bring them into conformity with the strict referringversus -denoting dichotomy. In Part 4, he offers a synopsis and some general conclusions. Importantly, in Part 2, Sullivan argues that semantic structure is a necessary but not sufficient condition of non-rigidity, that only denoting designnators are non-rigid, that all unstructured designators are rigid designators, and that the lack of semantic structure is necessary and sufficient for status as a referring expression. Contrary to the view which is now popular, Russell regarded ordinary proper names as...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.009
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.012
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.019
Threshold uncertainty score0.067

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0090.012
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0040.006
Science and technology studies0.0030.039
Scholarly communication0.0190.020
Open science0.0020.004
Research integrity0.0030.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.045
GPT teacher head0.303
Teacher spread0.258 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations1
Published2014
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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