Bibliographic record
Abstract
76 Reviews PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS David Blitz Philosophy Dept. and Peace Studies / Central Connecticut State U. New Britain, ct 06050, usa blitz@mail.ccsu.edu Graham Stevens. The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy: Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. xii, 185. isbn: 978-0-415-36044-9 (hb). £80.00. us$155.95. Graham Stevens has written a short book on a diUcult subject: the unity of the proposition. While the title of the volume is The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the underlying theme is the comparatively little discussed problem of how the elements of a proposition come together to form a unity, as indicated in the book’s subtitle: “Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Prop osition”. Stevens traces this concept, as a unifying thread or “central concern”, throughout Russell’s many philosophies which constitute for Stevens a “consis tent and constantly evolving philosophy” (p. 2) stretching from the earliest log ical writings to the later works of the 1930s and 1940s. This is an important and well written volume, which Russellians should have in their personal and uni versity libraries. That the “unity of the proposition” is a problem at all requires the reader to return to the neo-Hegelian idealism which Russell encountered as a student at Cambridge.1 Russell, inXuenced by Peano and Frege, broke with the doctrine of internal relations, defended by Bradley and others, according to which external relations are unreal and false appearance. However, an important element of idealism remains even during the Principia period, due to Russell’s continued belief that a proposition is a non-linguistic, non-mental, abstract entity; these elements are all of the same ontological kind, which can be identiWed through analysis and recombined so that their synthesis reconstitutes the original “unity of the proposition”. This turns out to be a very tall order which will occupy Russell for nearly half a century. Consider the standard example Russell gives: “Desdemona loves Cassio”. According to Russell, this proposition (independently of its truth or falsity) actually contains its “simple constituents”z—zwith “Desdemona” and “Cassio” being things and “loves” a concept. Russell, as a founder of analytic philosophy, has to defend the legitimacy of this analysis from the claim that it has reduced 1 Chapter 1: “Russell, Frege and the Analysis of Unities”. December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd Reviews 77 the structured unity of the proposition into an unstructured set of parts (or heap) where the original order of combination has been lost. The problem of is that merely listing “Desdemona”, “Cassio” and “loves” does not indicate the way in which the terms were originally combined or re lated. For reasons to be made clear later, this is referred to in the literature as the “narrow order problem”. In particular, the question arises as to how analysis enables us to assert that it is Desdemona who loves Cassio (supposing this to be the case), rather than the other way around (since love may not be requited). Stevens deals with logical form in a later chapter devoted to the problem of belief statements, but the notion applies here as well: analysis seems to have skip ped the logical form, the way in which the constituents are combined. But if the logical form is included, then there seems to be an extra constituent in the prop osition not given by direct inspection, and analysis would appear to have added something above and beyond what was there before the analysis. Adding linking relations to indicate how the components were originally combined does not help either. If there is some relation Lz which relates “Desdemona” and “loves” and another relation Rz which relates “loves” and “Cassio”, then there are Wve constituents, not three. Moreover, there is now room for inWnite regress, with a relation L2 linking “Desdemona” and L, R2 linking “loves” and “Cassio”, and so on. But without adding these additional items, there is an apparent failure of an alysis to fully provide the order of the elements present in the original...
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".