From Mathematics to Metaethics: The Cambridge Companion

eiews FROM MATHEMATICS TO METAETHICS: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION G S Philosophy / U. of Manchester Oxford Road, Manchester, ,   ..@.. Nicholas Griffin, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge U. P., . Pp. xvii + . £., . (hb);£., . (pb). ccording to the notes on the back cover of this latest addition to the CamAbridge Companions series, one aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation felt by new readers of the major philosophers covered. Few philosophers are likely to induce as much intimidation in students of their work as Russell. Aside from the challenge posed to his readers by the sheer quantity of work Russell produced, he also worked in some of the most rarefied air of philosophical inquiry , from philosophical and mathematical logic to the metaphysical and epistemological consequences of theoretical physics, consistently producing theories of great originality and ingenuity that have often left perplexed even those well acclimatized to these regions of thought. Furthermore, as if the prospect of scaling the edifice of Russell’s philosophy wasn’t made formidable enough already, one also has to cope with Russell’s many changes of heart over often fundamental features of his philosophy. This tendency of Russell’s, summed up famously by C. D. Broad’s remark that Russell produced “a new system of philosophy every few years”, is one that often leads Russell’s readers to mistakenly assume that there is no unity to be found in his work. Nicholas Griffin disposes of that mistake early in his introduction to the Companion: “What [Broad’s remark] ignores is the extent to which the various phases of Russell’s philosophy develop out of each other as different attempts to carry forward a single philosophical project” (p. ). One of the many merits of this collection of fifteen essays is that it stands as a convincing testament to Griffin’s claim.  Broad, “Critical and Speculative Philosophy”, in J. H. Muirhead, ed., Contemporary British Philosophy, nd series (New York: Macmillan, ), p. . russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  -  Reviews While it is true that Russell’s philosophy is difficult, it is also true that a thorough understanding of it is indispensable to any student of analytical philosophy , as Griffin makes perfectly clear in the opening paragraph of his introduction : It is difficult to over-estimate the extent to which Russell’s thought dominated twentiethcentury analytic philosophy: virtually every strand in its development either originated with him or was transformed by being transmitted through him. Analytic philosophy itself owes its existence more to Russell than to any other philosopher. (P. ) Griffin’s introduction is as good a starting-point in the study of Russell as any student will find. After giving an account of Russell’s life, Griffin proceeds to present a chronological survey of his philosophical work that highlights all of the central areas of Russell’s work. Griffin points out the importance, for example , of Russell’s principle of acquaintance (the demand that, to understand a proposition, one must stand in a relation of immediate acquaintance with all of its constituents), his constant realism regarding universals, and Russell’s conception of the relation between philosophy and science. The essay also draws attention to some neglected, yet fascinating, parts of Russell’s philosophy, such as his pre-emption in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth of Michael Dummett’s renowned extension of the debate between platonists and constructivists in mathematics over the status of the law of excluded middle to the wider realism debate in philosophy (pp. –). The text is helpfully supplemented by detailed references to works by Russell, works on Russell, and to later essays in the volume, all of which serve to make this introduction to the book an excellent introduction to Russell’s philosophy itself. The first essay, Ivor Grattan-Guinness’s “Mathematics in and behind Russell ’s Logicism”, as is to be expected, is one of several papers in the volume that concentrates on Russell’s logico-mathematical concerns. The paper avoids technical discussion and provides a rather brisk summary of Russell’s influences and advances. As a consequence...

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