Formalizing the Relationship between Security Policies and Objectives in Software Architectures
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
It is difficult to ensure the relationship between the selected security solutions and the security concerns in software architecture design. Assuring this analysis manually is labor intensive, expertise dependent and error prone. As a result, there is an increasing need for the development of reusable security solutions to aid in the early stages of secure system development. This paper proposes an approach for designing secure component-based software architectures using analysis around two main aspects: (1) the use of formal methods to formally verify and capture the satisfaction relationship between policies (security solutions) and the targeted security objectives (problems) and, (2) the definitions of these policies and security objectives as properties and provided as formal model libraries to support their reuse. To validate our work, we investigate a representative confidentiality security objective extracted from the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity) classification and its relationship with a related policy in the context of secure component-based software architecture development. The proposed model can assist system designers in reworking their designs in order to satisfy the identified security objectives. In this way, our approach can help in the development of dependable software systems. Finally, we propose an MDE-based tool to support the approach and automate part of the analysis using reusable formal models.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it