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Record W4377238672 · doi:10.1177/0160323x231173920

Are Municipal Budget Cycles Political? Evidence From Ontario, Canada

2023· article· en· W4377238672 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

VenueState and Local Government Review · 2023
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicFiscal Policies and Political Economy
Canadian institutionsBrock UniversityYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPoliticsGovernment (linguistics)Corporate governanceSample (material)Local governmentPublic economicsBusinessPublic administrationEconomicsEconomic policyPolitical scienceFinanceLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, we examine whether a political budget cycle exists in municipal governments that fall under tight financial and institutional regulation by senior orders of government. For other levels of government, there is evidence that politicians initiate popular programs in election years and delay the unpopular tax increases after the election. Using a sample of 444 Ontario municipalities, with few exceptions, no such evidence was found. The results are the same regardless of the length of the term (three or four year), municipal size (small, medium, or large), and the governance system (one or two-tier). The paper concludes with possible explanations as to why there are no opportunistic manipulations of municipal budgets.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.459
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.039
GPT teacher head0.241
Teacher spread0.201 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it