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Record W4381948808 · doi:10.1353/rss.2018.0007

Russell’s Principles of Mathematics

2018· article· de· W4381948808 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
G.E. Moore

Bibliographic record

VenueRussell the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies · 2018
Typearticle
Languagede
FieldPsychology
TopicPhilosophy and Theoretical Science
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsObject (grammar)Philosophy of mathematicsEpistemologyMathematicsFoundations of mathematicsPhilosophyOrder (exchange)Principal (computer security)Computer scienceLinguistics

Abstract

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 c:\users\ken\documents\type\red \rj   red.docx -- : RUSSELL’S PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS1 G. E. Moore [Bertrand Russell. The Principles of Mathematics. Vol. . Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., . Pp. (), xxix, .] f the philosophical books published in the United Kingdom in  the most important is Mr. Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. 2 In this book, Mr. Russell tells us, he has two main objects. His first object is to establish the two very important propositions () “that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts” and () “that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles.” The examination of the principal branches of pure mathematics, which is necessary to establish these two propositions, occupies the last six Parts of the book, which are entitled respectively “Number”, “Quantity”, “Order”, “Infinity and Continuity”, “Space”, and “Matter and Motion”. In these parts there is much which cannot be easily understood without a special knowledge of Mathematics, and much which has little bearing on philosophy, except so far as it helps to establish Mr. Russell’s two main propositions; but there is much also which is of considerable importance for philosophy, quite apart from its bearing on these two propositions: in particular, Mr. Russell examines very carefully the conceptions of Infinity and Continuity, and attempts to shew that they involve no antinomies. Part i, on the other hand, is devoted to Mr. Russell’s second object —“the explanation of the fundamental concepts which mathematics accepts as indefinable”, and is almost entirely philosophical in its nature. I shall endeavour to give some account () of the meaning and consequences of Mr. Russell’s two propositions concerning the relation of Logic and Mathematics () of some of the more important points dealt with in Part i and () of the theory of Infinity and Continuity. Mr. Russell is eminently qualified for his task by a thorough knowledge of Mathematics and by great philosophical acumen ; and it is certain that no philosopher ought in future to handle any of the subjects discussed in this book, without taking account of the arguments advanced in it. 1 The Principles of Mathematics. 2 [Typeset from a photocopy of the manuscript provided to the Russell Archives by Dorothy Moore in  (ra Rec. Acq. ). The original ms. is in the Moore papers in Cambridge U. Library. The review is © the Estate of G. E. Moore and is published with the Estate’s permission. Moore revised the ms. a great deal, the foliation being an indication:  , a, –(), –(), (), (), –(), (), (), (), a, , (?), –. Proofread by A. Duncan and K. Blackwell.] O Moore’s Review of The Principles of Mathematics  c:\users\ken\documents\type\red \rj   red.docx -- : Mr. Russell maintains, we have seen, the two very important propositions () “that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts” and () “that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles.” And in order to bring out the philosophical importance of his book, it will be well to explain as clearly as possible precisely what he means by them.There are several points, which require notice, in order that we may form a just estimate of what he is maintaining. In the first place, Mr. Russell makes then two assertions with regard to all the propositions of pure mathematics.What propositions does he mean to include in this description? It is important to recognize that there are certain kinds of propositions to which his assertions do not, and are not meant to, apply. It might, for instance, be thought that the familiar proposition of Euclid that “The three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles” was a proposition of pure mathematics. It is not, however, one of the propositions of which Mr. Russell is speaking. It cannot be deduced from any logical principles . It follows only if we assume certain of Euclid’s axioms, which cannot themselves be deduced from the principles of Logic. All that can be deduced from logical principles is that if these axioms of Euclid are true, then the...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.010
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.018
Threshold uncertainty score0.060

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.010
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0030.002
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0050.004
Science and technology studies0.0040.013
Scholarly communication0.0110.011
Open science0.0030.005
Research integrity0.0050.013
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0180.025

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.066
GPT teacher head0.335
Teacher spread0.269 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations1
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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