Learning of Deception in Adversarial Games with Hierarchical Multiobjective Reinforcement Learning
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
This thesis focuses on modelling deception in competitive differential games. By definition, differential games are games where two agents (or two groups of agents) have conflicting objectives. In other words, maximizing an agent's (or a group of agents') objective will minimize the other agent's (or a group of agents') pay-off. To increase the pay-off of one group, we implement deception in a differential game. On the other hand, the other group learns counter-deception to cope with the adversarials' strategy. To address deception and counter-deception, we implement the game of guarding territory and its derivatives. Our primary attempt consists of modelling deception using a hierarchical structure for pursuit-evasion games. The deception structure is made of two levels: a lower-level policy (LLP) that contains the optimal state-action values to reach a goal and a higher-level policy (HLP) that can change the lower-level policy's goal. While the players try to deceive their opponents using deception, the opponents try to detect deception and overcome the deceitful players. Reinforcement learning is the primary learning strategy in our study. We address the assignment problem in pursuit-evasion games, where multiple agents exist on each side. The assignment problem is solved by proposing a two-level policy system, where the pursuer's policy is calculated via a fuzzy actor-critic learning (FACL) algorithm. Our study is the first study on pursuit-evasion games where the assignment can be changed in the middle of the simulation. In addition, we proposed a hierarchical reinforcement learning scheme to provide broader control over the reward function hyperparameters. In other words, an HLP learns reward functions' hyperparameters.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it