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Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance

2023· article· en· W4385211693 on OpenAlexaff
Taeho Kim

Bibliographic record

VenueAcademy of Management Proceedings · 2023
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicDefense, Military, and Policy Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIncentivePromotion (chess)PsychologyApplied psychologyPublic relationsBusinessPolitical scienceEconomicsLawMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Public sector organizations often struggle to provide adequate promotion incentives. I study how bureaucrats' performance and career decisions respond to changes in promotion incentives. I use a unique setting in Chicago Police Department, where strict eligibility criteria suddenly reduced the promotion chances of some officers relative to an otherwise similar group of officers. The deterioration of chances to become managers induced the ineligible officers to sharply raise arrest performance and join high-performance tactical teams. In a large frontline bureaucracy, a lack of promotion opportunities may not necessarily demotivate bureaucrats who may instead pursue alternative careers as individual contributors.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.567
Threshold uncertainty score0.585

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.088
GPT teacher head0.264
Teacher spread0.177 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2023
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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