How to Fund Unemployment Insurance with Informality and False Claims: Evidence From Senegal
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper studies the welfare effects from the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in a context where formal workers represent only a small proportion of the labor market and informal workers can submit fraudulent claims for UI benefits.We model these features and allow for varying degrees of enforcement and different funding sources.We then estimate the model's key parameters by conducting a custom labor force survey in Senegal.Our findings show that the liquidity gains are large and the moral hazard response to the UI benefits among workers is relatively small: an extra dollar of UI benefits yields a consumption-equivalent gain of 60-90 cents, which exceeds comparable estimates from U.S. calibrations by a factor of three to sixteen.We then show that the welfare gains depend on the program design: UI funded through payroll taxes delivers the greatest welfare gains but becomes infeasible when there are few formal workers and high rates of fraudulent claims.On the other hand, UI funded through consumption taxes delivers lower welfare gains but remains feasible with high informality and false claims.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.016 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".