Debate: Political Authority, Functionalism, and the Problem of Annexation

Deciding whether a state has political authority is arguably the most fundamental judgment we can make about its moral standing. When a state possesses legitimate authority, it has the exclusive right to govern the occupants of its territory. Even when its decisions are inefficient, irrational, or morally mistaken, its subjects are expected to comply with the legal order it establishes, and outsiders are expected to refrain from attempting to interfere with its internal affairs. A state that lacks authority, on the other hand, enjoys no such protection: provided there is an adequate justification for doing so, its subjects are permitted to actively resist attempts to enforce the law, and outsiders are permitted to intervene in order to reform or replace state institutions.1 Given these practical stakes, it's crucial to settle on a plausible account of the requirements for legitimate political authority that can guide our assessments of both nascent and established states. Recently, Alexander Motchoulski has developed a novel “hybrid” account of political authority2 that he claims is up to this task. This hybrid view, which combines elements from existing functionalist and fair-play accounts3, establishes the authority of particular states in two stages.4 In the first stage, we determine whether the state satisfies various functionalist criteria such as the consistent protection of basic rights, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the reliable provision of essential public goods. If the state passes this test, we then examine whether the principle of fair play gives the territorially demarcated populations the state claims jurisdiction over reason to comply with its laws and support its institutions. This involves evaluating the goods provided by the state to see if they are either acceptable upon reflection or morally required. A good is acceptable if, given their interests, the recipients have reason to prefer acquiring the good plus a corresponding duty to reciprocate over not receiving this good at all. On the other hand, a good is morally required just in case the recipients have a moral duty to contribute to its provision regardless of whether the good is acceptable to them.5 If the aforementioned political goods meet either of these conditions, individuals benefiting from them have a duty to reciprocate the political cooperation of their co-citizens by obeying the laws of the state and doing their fair share to maintain its cooperative structure over time. It is this duty, owed by the citizens of a state to one another, that generates particularized relationships of authority between states and populations.6 According to Motchoulski, the primary attraction of his view is that, unlike orthodox functionalism, it is able to account for our beliefs that: (i) states generally lack authority over populations they incorporate through acts of non-consensual annexation or colonization, and (ii) historical injustices committed by the state will sometimes have an impact on its authority, but this impact can diminish or “fade” over time. Thus, by endorsing his view, functionalists can retain their basic normative commitments without running afoul of our intuitions about the boundaries of political authority.7 However, I argue that Motchoulski's view fails to deliver on this promise. Even if we accept his two-stage framework for assessing the authority of states, we cannot rule out the possibility that states can acquire legitimate authority over populations they unilaterally annex, nor can we reach reasonable judgments about when and how historical injustices undermine the authority of states. Having established this, I suggest that instead of looking for other ways to rehabilitate functionalism, we should accommodate our intuitions about these issues by endorsing a theory of political authority that recognizes the moral importance of collective self-determination. Cases where one state unilaterally annexes another pose a problem for orthodox functionalism because of the view's singular focus on whether candidates for political authority are performing various morally important tasks. Since functionalists contend that the adequate provision of basic political goods is sufficient to ground a claim to legitimate political authority, endorsing their view means accepting that, so long as they govern in a reasonably just manner, the annexing power has a right to govern its newly acquired territory. Yet, this strikes most of us as wrong. Intuitively, states cannot legitimately extend the boundaries of their authority this way, even if the annexation is bloodless and the annexing power does not violate anyone's individual rights.8 One of Motchoulski's central claims is that, by taking considerations of fair play into account when evaluating states, his version of functionalism is able to avoid this counterintuitive result. To develop this claim, he begins by demonstrating that the presence of pre-existing reciprocal duties among co-citizens is sufficient to make unilateral annexation wrong. As he contends, certain kinds of positive first-order duties, including duties of reciprocity, give rise to negative, second-order duties of non-interference. For example, if I have a reciprocity-based obligation to help my friend move between cities, my roommate has a corresponding obligation not to force me to stay in town by hiding my car keys because they believe my time would be better spent volunteering with them. By the same token, because co-citizens of a legitimate state owe reciprocal duties of political cooperation and compliance to each other, and unilateral annexation ostensibly interferes with the fulfillment of these duties, acts of annexation wrong the annexed individuals by violating a second-order duty that is owed to them. Having established this, Motchoulski then argues that when alternatives are available, benefits conferred through acts of wrongdoing clearly do not count as acceptable or morally required. And if the benefits of political cooperation are neither acceptable nor morally required from the newly annexed population's point of view, the annexing state cannot demand compliance or support from this population by appealing to the principle of fair play.9 Although Motchoulski's version of functionalism represents a major improvement over traditional accounts, I believe his response to the annexation objection ultimately fails. To see why, it's helpful to divide acts of unilateral annexation into two categories: total annexations and partial annexations. Total annexation occurs when State A forcibly claims authority over all of State B's territory and subsequently replaces all of B's political institutions with their own, effectively dismantling B as a political entity. By contrast, in cases of partial annexation State A forcibly claims authority over some of State B's territory and the corresponding residents, but leaves B intact as an independent state. In the remainder of this section, I will show that the hybrid functionalist/fair play account cannot reliably rule out the possibility of states obtaining political authority over their newly incorporated populations in either kind of case because both total and partial annexations can occur without interfering with existing duties of reciprocity. Starting with cases of total annexation, suppose that the United States successfully carries out a bloodless annexation of all of Canada and subsequently declares that all former Canadian citizens are now citizens of the United States with all the attendant rights and obligations. Instead of being covered by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, their rights are now protected by the Constitution. Instead of electing members of Parliament in Ottawa, they vote to send representatives to Congress in Washington DC, and so on. Could Canadians complain that this change interferes with their ability to discharge their ongoing reciprocal duties to each other? I think the answer is clearly "no". This change would, of course, alter the bundle of political and civil rights held by Canadians: the precise scope of their right to freedom of expression would change somewhat, as would the extent and content of their right to political participation, and so forth. However, for functionalists like Motchoulski, the political goods that citizens have a reciprocal obligation to provide—e.g. institutions that grant all individuals a degree of political power and legal protections that safeguard individuals against arbitrary interference in their private lives10—are not precisely specified rights or entitlements. Rather, they are generic goods that can be secured through a variety of distinct schemes of rights.11 So, as long as the scheme maintained by the United States does an adequate job of securing the relevant generic goods, following annexation individual Canadians would still be able to reciprocate the benefits provided to them by their co-citizens through obedience to the law and contributions to the institutions that provide them with essential services. The only difference is that this would now involve complying with US laws and supporting the US institutions they are collectively subject to. Here, Motchoulski might object that my argument misinterprets the content of the Canadians’ reciprocal political obligations. There are two versions of this objection worth considering, so I will address each in turn. The first version says that since individual Canadians had been benefiting from the protection of particular Canadian laws and the goods provided by particular Canadian institutions, the principle of fair play obligates them to comply with the same set of laws and support the same institutions going forward. Therefore, the kind of total annexation we are examining does in fact wrong the annexed population by interfering with their ability to discharge their duties of reciprocity. The problem with this version of the objection is that it seems implausibly restrictive to understand reciprocal political obligations in this way. Motchoulski's observation that the reciprocal benefit one returns must be “fitting and proportionate”12 only dictates the goods that one has a duty to contribute to and the level of contribution required; it does not directly determine the exact channels through which one must make this contribution. If I have a duty of reciprocity to contribute to the provision of good G for the benefit of population P, and I can make an equal and satisfactory contribution by donating to either organization or organization the to I owe the duty have no for if I to instead of or is that a fair contribution to G is the fact that my citizens and I have reciprocity-based obligations to each rights and contribute to public goods does not that we must comply in with the particular set of laws and institutions that our provided that there are that would this just as If it change to the legal and political institutions we are subject to would be wrong on Motchoulski's view, even through democratic with the support of the This us to the version of the In response to the just Motchoulski might point out that the goods with political cooperation to for example, is only if my co-citizens and I reliably and the legal and that govern our If we to the law in of our moral or if we are about is in our with each other, it is that rights will For this the principle of fair play does not members of a political to comply with the exact same set of laws and institutions over it does them to settle on public for which laws and institutions they are collectively subject to and only through the laws and institutions these political will be to and the state will be to provide the goods that its rule in the first And if this is it seems to that the unilateral annexation of Canada by the United States does interfere with the ability of Canadians to their reciprocal political obligations as it replaces the legal by them in with their internal with a that they had no in and to I the of this objection goods are clearly secured through over and this fact no some in whether a particular set of institutions will the reciprocal provision of these goods. it that a population can only their reciprocal political obligations through institutions internal that they have the of a legal from the can of political by the of with the law, or by the law there to be that an annexing power to these about of Canadians to comply with US law for be by for public of the law be by a of the legal and public the most important they successfully such US institutions in principle be just as at political cooperation as the Canadians’ former institutions and the annexation of Canada by the United States would not interfere with the ability of Canadians to discharge their reciprocal political obligations. So, because the total annexation of a can occur without violating the second-order duty of that duties of reciprocity give rise Motchoulski's theory fails to the goods provided by the annexing power are not a morally acceptable for duties of fair play in such about cases of partial first it might that in these cases there is interference with the annexed population's existing duties of reciprocity. For example, if the United States annexed the of but the of Canada it is to see how to provide their Canadians with reciprocal benefits by a of legal rights and to public goods, since would no be subject to the same set of political institutions as the of However, given the structure of political reciprocity, I do not think that these interfere with duties of fair play reciprocal have an A gives some good to B at so B an that on at then B A with some benefit at that A at and so on for the of their the kind of political reciprocity we are with has a As Motchoulski in a a state of is where compliance with the law the duties they owe to their co-citizens and generates reciprocal duties to the law, which their co-citizens then discharge or in an ongoing This difference is morally relevant because it the ways in which outsiders to these relationships can violate their second-order duties of non-interference. When two or are in an of reciprocity, them so that they can no will at one individual without a fair for the benefits they provided and at one other from their reciprocal obligations. This does not to be the case when it to relationships political reciprocity, with our example, in the annexation it's of that have an obligation to their Canadians to comply with Canadian law because they are from the legal compliance of their and their Canadians in have an obligation to them to do the at the that the annexation of is and are no subject to Canadian institutions, these duties of reciprocity are do not have duties of reciprocity to Canadians by they an benefit to their Canadians by complying with Canadian law for as long as they benefiting from the protection of their institutions. For the same Canadians do not have obligations to The of this is that partial annexations do relationships of reciprocity, they do not interfere with anyone's ability to their existing political obligations. Motchoulski's argument fails to that partial annexations are wrong by that annexing generally lack political authority over their newly acquired and it is worth that Motchoulski to this by out that, even if his particular account of the wrong of unilateral annexation is not his hybrid functionalist theory will still with our that states lack political authority over territory acquired through unilateral annexation as long as we can provide some account of such annexations wrong However, I of this since I believe that the most of the wrong of unilateral annexation to the of collective and we this, we have reason to for as an independent for legitimate political I will to this point in Having Motchoulski's of the problem of unilateral annexation, I now to argue that, to he his hybrid view fails to provide a plausible to the of historical that has long functionalist of political injustices pose a problem for functionalist to their exclusive focus on whether the state is doing an adequate job of its basic rights, these cannot account for the that a of into the a claim to authority over the of these injustices as as their the state authority over these as the of these injustices over Motchoulski attempts to his version of functionalism with this by appealing to the that individuals only have a duty of reciprocity to comply with the if the benefits conferred by the state are acceptable to them. On his view, to the extent that the of such as and that incorporated into the state through annexation or maintain cooperative that duties of reciprocity that with the of the these are not required to accept the benefits conferred by the state. as if the political goods provided by the state are not acceptable or morally required from the point of view of a particular the state will lack authority over this Motchoulski that this of reliably our judgments about when injustices to on the political since the only retain a claim to for as long as they to in of it is not that we believe that the of of but have long since been into and the benefits provided to them by their are now legitimately subject to the this argument from duties with our intuitions about historical in some it seems to in a version of Motchoulski's and case following annexation, the state to to the of political cooperation precisely so that they do not with the of the legal this is through but over time the state in the that they can legal in order to the between the state and the This in a the to some in by they have effectively with their of political cooperation that would with the legal obligations that on them. However, now them as citizens with equal civil rights, the of from the state and share the of their political I it that, in this the do not have reciprocity-based political obligations to On the it seems to me that they are to the ongoing of legal order and with their of political that Motchoulski's theory cannot this On his view, since the at some point with the political that with the authority of the their cannot reasonably the benefits of political cooperation they through institutions, and they are by the principle of fair play to comply with I think this is a against the hybrid functionalist Although I that there must be some which historical injustices no the of particular states, it seems morally to claim that a state can have authority over the of a territory it forcibly annexed because the state so at this traditional political that, for the time their have but to into their political the so The of Motchoulski's hybrid theory is to provide an account of political authority that can address the problem and the problem of historical basic functionalist In the I have that his view in to both of these the principle of fair play into the functionalist framework does us to individuals have obligations to particular states. However, it does not functionalism to avoid the annexation nor does it provide us with a reasonable account of when injustices are no relevant to of state this we for other ways to functionalism from these I think it is to first the moral considerations that our to cases unilateral annexation and historical and then examine how these considerations should be into a theory of political and I believe our intuitions about these issues an of the moral of political and the in collective to functionalist to the citizens and of a state do not of as for is a means of securing individual rights and they with and their as members of a by a distinct of cooperation on their territory and maintained through of In they see as being of a political individuals have a in a between this kind of political and the political institutions they are subject to. As members of a we and when we are able to the laws that govern us because these laws have been by us in with our commitments and this in collective is when one annexes Since this involves the of a political order by outsiders do not share their of political following annexation the newly incorporated population will no be able to their in the political institutions that structure of their there is a in which unilateral annexation the population even in cases where it has no impact on their individual rights or duties of reciprocity. the presence of this wrong to our that states lack political authority over populations they I think it some kind of moral there is no reason a population that has a political good like should be expected to settle for by the authority of institutions that them this The moral at play seems when we our to the between historical and political If the of an annexed population maintain their as a distinct political and to a between this and the annexing institutions, they are no their to complain that their political their in collective Yet, it is clearly for this to be over time. In some this will be to these to with the annexing as are up and this In the will retain their and the annexing state will ultimately make by a of them to have a degree of political they way, the is that individuals no the that political rule following unilateral annexation and acts of annexation no on the political This account of when and how historical injustices from the Motchoulski between cases the of a territory example, the and cases the of a subject to historical injustices example, In the former set of we that injustices do not undermine the authority of the state because the of no as a distinct By contrast, in the set of cases it is that the have maintained their as a distinct political and their political and so we believe that the claim to authority over them is unlike Motchoulski's view, it the in cases like the version of and in This is of cooperation that with the state can be of a for their presence is not to ground a against the authority on this that is is that the do in fact from a lack of between their and their political institutions, which by the Given the central that the of collective in our moral judgments about these there is a case for an account of political authority that for as an independent for state that various other if the of is a wrong that, in cases of annexation, the state lacks political authority over the annexed population and their it to reason that if a state this in other ways its claim to authority should be as Motchoulski that we instead incorporate the of into his hybrid framework by that political goods are only acceptable in the if they do not at the of this would then be able to account for our intuitions unilateral annexation and historical and the developed in this would no a fundamental to his I think this would Motchoulski with a The of functionalism is to the view's singular focus on the that states to play in securing a of political goods. By claims to authority in this functionalist provide an for are of political to the of or including the of collective we have been of functionalism make a point of issues with collective as a for Thus, for example, the that the state as a for the of a or is with a to that political authority on whether the boundaries the of would the freedom of individuals by the ability of states to a I believe these issues can be for that do not it is appealing to instead functionalist when about a for this is if we functionalism in a that up it to the of collective into account So, the structure of Motchoulski's account does to move in this doing so would with a view that is if not to its Having this I think it's to that Motchoulski's hybrid cannot deliver on its that we do not to give up our intuitions about unilateral annexation and historical does this that we should the functionalist framework One argue that we have reason to for as an independent for legitimate political authority, this is only in cases where the population does in fact as a political with a to be In other cases where the population a territory is so that even an cannot be it seems reasonable to instead a functionalist point of view when assessing candidates for political authority, since our primary focus should be on that individual rights are it's important not to of the difference between this kind of view and endorsing functionalism as a theory of political Even in cases where it is to grant institutions authority on functionalist we should that, over the subject to these institutions will to think of as a political with their on should govern them. And when this we should be to our and demand that, going these institutions must the political of their subjects in order to retain their right to For helpful and on versions of this I would like to and an on this by a from the and of There are no of relevant to this The declares not for this relevant are in the

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