Emission Reduction and Channel Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Service Spillovers
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The development of e-commerce and the green economy has prompted suppliers of green products to introduce internet channels by which products are directly sold to consumers. However, the emergence of “price wars” and “free riding” between the two channels after the introduction of online channels may affect the stability of the green supply chain. This paper uses optimization theory to investigate the impact of service spillover effects and different channel structures on the optimal decision of supply chain members in a Stackelberg game. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the single-channel and dual-channel supply chain in a setting with and without retail services, we observe that the supplier prefers to encroach on the market when services that retail locations provide largely spillover to and benefit the direct sales channel. Contrary to popular belief, a higher degree of service spillovers is beneficial for the retailer to achieve more returns under the dual-channel structure, whereas supplier encroachment will lead to a decline in the service level if the spillover degree is relatively low. In addition, the emission reduction level of products under supplier encroachment is always higher than that employed in the single-channel structure if consumers have both low-carbon preference and a high degree of service sensitivity. Finally, we expand our discussion by introducing the carbon cap-and-trade (CCT) mechanism to compare the conditions for achieving Pareto improvement under supplier encroachment. These results can provide helpful insights for decision-makers in supply chain management to implement effective channel selection and achieve sustainable development.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".