Identifying the Hazard Boundary of ML-Enabled Autonomous Systems Using Cooperative Coevolutionary Search
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In Machine Learning (ML)-enabled autonomous systems (MLASs), it is essential to identify thehazard boundaryof ML Components (MLCs) in the MLAS under analysis. Given that such boundary captures the conditions in terms of MLC behavior and system context that can lead to hazards, it can then be used to, for example, build a safety monitor that can take any predefined fallback mechanisms at runtime when reaching the hazard boundary. However, determining suchhazard boundaryfor an ML component is challenging. This is due to the problem space combining system contexts (i.e., scenarios) and MLC behaviors (i.e., inputs and outputs) being far too large for exhaustive exploration and even to handle using conventional metaheuristics, such as genetic algorithms. Additionally, the high computational cost of simulations required to determine any MLAS safety violations makes the problem even more challenging. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to consider a region in the problem space deterministically safe or unsafe due to the uncontrollable parameters in simulations and the non-linear behaviors of ML models (e.g., deep neural networks) in the MLAS under analysis. To address the challenges, we propose MLCSHE (ML Component Safety Hazard Envelope), a novel method based on a Cooperative Co-Evolutionary Algorithm (CCEA), which aims to tackle a high-dimensional problem by decomposing it into two lower-dimensional search subproblems. Moreover, we take aprobabilisticview of safe and unsafe regions and define a novel fitness function to measure the distance from the probabilistic hazard boundary and thus drive the search effectively. We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of MLCSHE on a complex Autonomous Vehicle (AV) case study. Our evaluation results show that MLCSHE is significantly more effective and efficient compared to a standard genetic algorithm and random search.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".